clarify or reject the facts that have been mentioned in the report and submitted to the Court’s consideration (also known as “complementary facts”). 65 The exception to this principle are facts that qualify as supervening, which can be submitted to the Court at any stage of the proceedings prior to the delivery of judgment. 91. The Court finds in the instant case that the circumstances leading to the State’s position serve to explain or clarify the information given in the factual framework set forth in Report on the Merits 66/11. The State’s arguments will not therefore be held as preliminary considerations. Likewise, considering the decision on preliminary objections, the Court will hold the facts provided by the representatives in their autonomous brief as evidence and will consider them in its discussion on the merits of the case. B. Decision on the status of Lucinda Rojas Landa as an alleged victim The position of the Commission and the representatives and the State’s arguments 92. When the Commission brought the case before the Court, it named Lucinda Rojas Landa as an alleged victim of violations of Article 8, 25, 5(1) and 5(2) of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1), given her relationship with Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez. This was based on an expert forensic anthropological opinion that had recorded participation by Lucinda Rojas Landa in her capacity as Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez’ domestic partner. 93. The representatives clarified that “they [did] not represent Lucinda Rojas Landa in this proceeding” and that at no point in the litigation had they identified her as an alleged victim of the case. 94. The State dismissed the claims of a relationship between alleged victim Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez and Lucinda Rojas Landa, arguing that they had not had such a sustained, ongoing relationship as to have created family ties or an emotional link that could justify holding her as an alleged victim. The State explained that, although Lucinda Rojas Landa did live for a time with Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, she had done so without contracting marriage or meeting the domestic legal requirements for common-law marriage, by which she would have acquired legal rights as his partner. They also drew attention to the statements that Lucinda Rojas Landa had made in the domestic jurisdiction in which she had not mentioned Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, instead naming another partner. The State also pointed to the fact that Edgar Odón Cruz Acuña, Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez’ brother, had not mentioned Lucinda Rojas Landa at any time as part of the family group, and this demonstrated that she was not close to the alleged victim and therefore, her rights had not been breached. Finally, responding to the fact that Lucinda Rojas Landa had been singled out as an alleged victim, the State argued that she had not been named as such by the representatives, and therefore, they did not represent her legally; this demonstrated, among other things, that she was not close to the other family members of the alleged victim. The State also held that the evidence submitted by the Commission was neither indicative nor sufficient to prove an affective bond. It particularly noted that Lucinda Rojas Landa had given testimony during the domestic legal investigations, revealing that her relationship with Nicolás Cruz Sánchez “had not lasted more than a year and a half, and that it had ended two years, ten months prior to the death […] in April, 1997.” It consequently asked that she not be included as an alleged victim. Considerations of the Court Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners” v. Peru. supra, para. 153, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 289, para. 35. 65