11 has it determined individual criminal responsibilities. In its request for interpretation brief, Mexico equates the determination of the State’s international responsibility for the acts of its agents with the determination of individual criminal responsibilities. The latter would require, among other matters, the individualization and identification of the alleged perpetrators and their respective criminal punishments, which cannot be deduced from the judgment. In fact, the Court did not evaluate the conduct of possible authors of the facts under domestic criminal law, nor did it include dogmatic reasoning or arguments on the interpretation of criminal law or rule on the punishment or what this should consist of. To the contrary, in accordance with the basic principles of international law, in order to establish whether the State’s international responsibility is entailed in a case submitted to its consideration, the Inter-American Court must determine whether its agents have committed an act or omission. Thus, the decision as to whether the State has incurred international responsibility entails the examination of the acts of the agents of the different State organs and bodies. Consequently, in any case in which the Court has found the international responsibility of the State concerned, it has found that this arose from an act or omission of one or more State agents. c) Presumption of innocence 33. Regarding the Court’s alleged violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, this Court has indicated that this principle is one of the pillars of judicial guarantees,8 since it means that the accused does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is charged, because the onus probandi corresponds to his accuser,9 and it establishes that a person may not be sentenced and convicted unless his criminal responsibility has been fully proved. Furthermore, the Court has held that this principle is an essential element for the effective exercise of the right to defense and accompanies the accused during the processing of the proceedings until a final judgment determining his guilt has been delivered. 10 In this regard, the presumption of innocence is violated if, before the accused is found guilty, a judicial decision concerning him reflects the opinion that he is guilty. 11 34. As the Court has mentioned previously, the judgment in this case did not determine any individual criminal responsibility for the rape of the victim (supra para. 32), and State agents were not specifically individualized and identified. Consequently, the Court cannot be attributed with any violation of the presumption of innocence. Indeed, the Court has established clearly in its case law that the presumption of innocence corresponds to “any person accused of a crime,” 12 and it is 8 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77; Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 145, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010 Series C No. 220, para. 182. 9 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 182. 10 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 11, para. 154, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 183. 11 12 Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 184. Cf. Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 129; Case of Barreto Leiva v.