that they rejected it, indicating that, under this law, their land titles [were] vulnerable because it established legal formulas for the fragmentation of the Garifuna territories and permitted the regularization of lands possessed – even if irregularly – by third parties, as in the case of the Rio Miel settlers. The representatives also argued that the criteria of “inalienability, imprescriptibility and immunity from seizure” recognized by this law, was subject “to the willingness of the communities, as these criteria could disappear with the approval of, for example, an executive committee”; this meant that the law failed to guarantee the inalienability of communal lands and instead allowed communities to dispose of them freely, to establish liens, mortgages or other encumbrances, or to lease them. 205. The State indicated that it had based its actions on different laws that regulated this matter and pointed out that it had acted in compliance with ILO Convention No. 169, to which it had been a party since 1995. Additionally, it considered that article 346 of the Constitution, article 92 of the Agricultural Sector Modernization and Development Act, and the provisions of chapter III of the Property Act regarding the “Land regularization process for indigenous peoples and Afro-Hondurans” which establishes the process for regularizing indigenous territories, were sufficient to guarantee territorial rights. In this respect, the State argued that it did not need to adapt its legal system, because its laws were duly aligned with the American Convention. C.2 Considerations of the Court 206. Regarding Article 2 of the American Convention, the Court has indicated that this obliges States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of the Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms protect by the Convention. 228 In other words, “[t]he general duty [derived from this article] entails the adoption of measures of two kinds: on the one hand, the elimination of norms and practices that in any way violate the guarantees established in the Convention and, on the other hand, the promulgation of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees.” 229 207. In view of the arguments of the parties, the Court notes that both the Commission and the representatives had merely indicated briefly and in general some provisions that, according to them, could be contrary to the Convention, without providing further arguments applicable to the instant case. Nevertheless, those arguments relate to two moments: (a) the laws in force when the titles were awarded, and b) the current legislation. 208. Regarding the first moment, the Court notes that article 346 of the Honduran Constitution provided for the protection of the rights and interests of the indigenous communities, especially of the lands and forests where they were settled. 230 However, 228 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, para. 51, and Case of the Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and their members, supra, para. 192. and Case of Tarazona Arrieta et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 15, 2014. Series C No. 286, para. 153. 229 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207, and Case of Tarazona Arrieta et al., supra, para. 153. 230 Article 346 of the 1982 Constitution of Honduras stipulates that: “[i]t is the obligation of the State to adopt measures to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous communities that exist in the 60