she “took a bottle of Epamin, which is the medication he took, in case [she] found him, so that [she] could give him the pill that [she] knew he needed.” 224 184. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Narciso González Medina suffered cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment when he was in the State’s custody and, consequently, this constitutes a violation of Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument. In addition, it considers that the argument of the representatives concerning the classification of this treatment as torture refers to effects that were examined under the right to humane treatment and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment established in Article 5(2) of the Convention; consequently, it finds it unnecessary to make an additional ruling in this regard. 185. Regarding Article 4 of the American Convention, the Court has considered that, owing to the nature of forced disappearance, the victim is in an aggravated situation of vulnerability, which gives rise to the risk of the violation of several rights, including the right to life. In addition, the Court has established that forced disappearance has frequently included the execution of those detained, in secret and without any type of trial, followed by the concealment of the corpse in order to erase any material trace of the crime and to ensure the impunity of those who committed it, which signifies a violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4 of the Convention. 225 186. With regard to the Dominican Republic’s request to exclude the alleged violation of Article 3 of the American Convention (supra para. 85), the Court notes that, according to its most recent case law, given the multiple and complex nature of this grave human rights violation, in the case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, this Court reconsidered its previous position and found it possible that forced disappearance can entail a specific violation of the said right because the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or the whereabouts of the individual, together with all the other elements of the disappearance, results in the “removal of the protection of the law” 226 or the violation of the personal safety and legal certainty of the individual, and this directly prevents the recognition of juridical personality. 227 This reasoning has been applied by the Court in its latest decisions relating to forced disappearances. 228 187. The Court has considered that the inherent content of the right to recognition of juridical personality is, precisely, that the individual is recognized, anywhere, as a subject of rights and obligations, with the right to enjoy the fundamental civil rights, and this implies the capacity to be the possessor of rights (capacity and enjoyment) and obligations. The 224 Statement made by Luz Altagracia Ramírez before the Inter-American Court during the public hearing held in this case on June 28, 2011. 225 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra note 18, para. 157, and Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 150, para. 96. 226 Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 150, para. 86. Similarly, cf. Caso Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra note 49, paras. 98 and 99. 227 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 56, para. 180, and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 52, para. 99. 228 Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 150, paras. 90 to 101; Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 50, para. 157; Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 52, para. 102; Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra note 49, paras. 98 to 102; Case of Gomes Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, supra note 53, para. 122; Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 150, para. 92; Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 106, and Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, supra note 51, para. 88. 61