accused, it should grant him an alternative precautionary measures to deprivation of liberty, whatever the gravity of the crime.”100 79. On May 12, 2006, the office of the Eighth Prosecutor with Full National Jurisdiction of the Public Prosecution Service presented its answer to the appeal that had been filed requesting that it be declared inadmissible.101 To this end, it stated, inter alia, that “this is the first time in the country’s history that a terrorist act of this magnitude has been perpetrated; in this case with international transcendence, because it was perpetrated against public government institutions of other nations” and that “during the investigations, it had been determined” that Mr. Díaz Peña “participated in the planning of the said attack, and the trial was the appropriate occasion for the defense to disprove the elements that the Public Prosecution Service [had presented] in the indictment.”102 80. The Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area, which heard cases on crimes related to terrorism, declared the appeal admissible,103 but when deciding on the merits on June 19, 2006, it declared it irreceivable, “in correct compliance with the binding case law of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice” and, consequently, confirmed the contested decision.104 To this end, it founded its decision, inter alia, on the fact that the procedural delay could “not be attributed to the First Instance Court, but to the accused’s defense counsel”; that the principle of proportionality established in article 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure implied that the judicial preventive detention of an individual should be applied “only or specifically in the case of those offenses that represent harm with social relevance; in other words, this provision requires that the illegal act investigated should produce real harm of criminal relevance,” and that “although it is true that more than two years has elapsed in this case, it is also true that” it was necessary to abide by the binding case law of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.105 It added that the case involved charges of crimes that were greatly in excess of the provisions of the first paragraph of article 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,106 so that “the procedural presumption of FLIGHT RISK by the accused” was applicable, because “one of the circumstances or presumptions that determine flight risk” is “the punishment that could possibly be imposed on the 100 Appeal filed by Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense counsel before the Court of Appeal of the Caracas Metropolitan Area on April 17, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9275 to 9282). 101 Cf. Response to the appeal of the Eighth Prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor’s Office with national jurisdiction dated May 12, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9360 to 9365). 102 Response to the appeal of the Eighth Prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor’s Office with national jurisdiction dated May 12, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9360 to 9365). 103 Cf. Ruling of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area for hearing cases on crimes related to terrorism of June 12, 2006 (evidence file, tome XXIII, folios 15626 to 15628). 104 Cf. Ruling of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area for hearing cases on crimes related to terrorism on June 19, 2006 (evidence file, tome XXIII, folios 15629 to 15643). 105 Cf. Ruling of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area for hearing cases on crimes related to terrorism on June 19, 2006 (evidence file, tome XXIII, folios 15629 to 15643). 106 The first paragraph of this norm states that “[r]isk of flight shall be presumed in case of acts punishable with imprisonment with a maximum length of ten years or more. In this case, and provided that the circumstances of article 250 concur, the prosecutor of the Public Prosecution Service must request the measure of judicial deprivation of liberty. In any case, the judge may, based on the circumstances, which he must reason, reject the prosecutor’s request and impose on the accused an alternative precautionary measure. The ruling may be appealed by the prosecutor or the victim, whether or not the latter has filed a complaint, within the five days following its publication.” Code of Criminal Procedure (evidence file, tome XXVI, folio 17561). 26