in charge of the case should conduct this hearing in accordance with the legal provisions and time frame.”114 84. On February 26, 2007, the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area declared itself competent to hear the application for amparo, but held that it was inadmissible under the provisions of article 6(5) of the Organic Law for the Protection of Constitutional Guarantees and Rights; in other words, because the plaintiff had chosen to exercise the ordinary means of contestation established by law, but had not complied precisely with the legal criteria to ensure that the application for amparo would be successful,115 since Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense counsel had chosen to file an appeal against the decision rejecting the review of the preventive measure. In addition, the Chamber indicated that, according to article 264 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the review of the measure of deprivation of liberty can be requested as often as necessary and its refusal did not constitute a violation of a constitutional right or guarantee.116 85. On March 2, 2007, Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense counsel appealed the declaration of inadmissibility.117 On May 11, 2007, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the appeal and confirmed the decision of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal. In this regard, it considered that, “in accordance with the case law [of the said Chamber,] the plaintiff could file the appeal, as he did, against the decision that is the subject of the application for amparo that refused to revise a measure of deprivation of liberty because more than two years had passed and he had not been tried, and for this reason it is inadmissible pursuant to the provisions of article 6(5) of the Organic Law for the Protection of Constitutional Guarantees and Rights.”118 Sixth request for review of the measure of judicial preventive detention 86. The sixth request for review of the measure of deprivation of liberty was presented on April 17, 2007,119 and refused on April 23, 2007,120 on similar grounds to the five previous refusals (supra, para. 75). D) Sentence and conviction, and waiver of the right of appeal 87. Finally, Mr. Díaz Peña was sentenced and convicted to nine years and four months’ imprisonment by a judgment handed down on April 29, 2008, by the Fourth First Instance Trial 114 Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of December 19, 2006 (evidence file, tome XXIV, folio 16563). 115 In particular, the decision stated that since “the complainants have not exhausted the ordinary means stipulated by criminal procedural law, and have not complied faithfully with the legal requirements for the application for amparo to be successful.” Ruling of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area with full competence to hear cases for crimes concerning terrorism at the constitutional level of February 26, 2007 (evidence file, tome XXIV, folios 16597 to 16607). 116 Cf. Ruling of the Special First Incidental Chamber of the Court of Appeal of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area with full competence to hear cases for crimes related to terrorism at the constitutional level of February 26, 2007 (evidence file, tome XXIV, folios 16597 to 16607). 117 Cf. Appeal filed on March 2, 2007 (evidence file, tome XXIV, folios 16636 to 16647). 118 Ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of May 11, 2007 (evidence file, tome XXIV, folios 16660 to 16682). 119 Cf. Request for review of the judicial measure of preventive detention, filed by Raúl José Díaz Peña’s defense counsel, on April 17, 2007 (evidence file, tome XVI, folios 9972 to 9975 and 10028). 120 Cf. Ruling of the Fourth First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial District of the Caracas Metropolitan Area on April 23, 2007 (evidence file, tome XVI, folios 10040 to 10050). 28