March 20, 2009. Up until that time, it could have been considered that the matter related to a complaint of violation of due process in the context of a criminal trial that was underway and the duration of which had not exceeded a reasonable time. Hence, the State cannot be blamed for the fact that, when presenting its observations on the petition, it made no specific reference to the available remedies, with the important exception that will be mentioned when analyzing the aspect regarding the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health (infra paras. 126 and 127). Arguments relating to the preventive detention and the duration of the proceedings 123. The Commission considered that domestic remedies had been exhausted bearing in mind that different appeals had been filed over the period from March 24, 2006, to May 11, 2007 (supra para. 119(c)). Thus, it referred to appeals filed over a period that began more than five months after the initial petition was lodged before the Commission and culminated one year and seven months after this. The Court finds that, in these circumstances, it cannot be understood that the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention has been satisfied. Furthermore, the Court observes that, when the initial petition was forwarded to the State on February 23, 2007, the decision of May 11, 2007, that supposedly exhausted domestic remedies had not yet been issued. 124. Moreover, it cannot be considered that domestic remedies had been exhausted by the requests filed by Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense counsel in the context of the criminal proceedings that were underway at the time (nullity based on failure to comply with the legal methods and conditions, nullity of an expert opinion offered by the Public Prosecution Service; requests for review of the preventive detention). In fact, the appropriate remedy in this regard, was to appeal the judgment delivered at the end of the proceedings (without prejudice to the possibility of contesting it owing to the excessive duration of the proceedings or of the preventive detention). As already indicated (supra para. 88), Mr. Díaz Peña expressly waived the right to file this appeal, and the Inter-American Commission declared that “the arguments concerning the irregularities in the criminal proceedings that could have been rectified by contesting the adverse judgment were inadmissible” (supra para. 42). 125. Based on the above, the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State is admitted as regard the facts relating to the preventive detention of Mr. Díaz Peña and the duration of the proceedings. Arguments relating to the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health 126. The situation is different as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health (which the Commission alluded to as “the detention conditions and absence of medical attention”) (supra para. 112). The corresponding arguments were submitted in the initial petition and, although the Commission had not yet explained the division of the different aspects of the case into three parts, the State could not ignore that, in that regard, it should have referred to precise and opportune remedies. Despite this, the State did not indicate specifically – either then or later – the remedies that could have been filed to obtain an improvement in the poor detention conditions that were alleged and to prevent the consequent deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health that was alleged. That omission leads to the conclusions that, in this respect, there were no remedies to be exhausted. Consequently, the exception to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46)(2)(a) of the American Convention is applicable. 127. Therefore, the Court rejects the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health. 46