of the punishment; moreover, he was not prevented from exercising other actions or remedies designed to safeguard his rights that had presumably been violated. In this regard, the State indicated that “the petitioner or his representatives should have indicated expressly before the Commission which of the situations established in Article 46[(2)(b)] of the American Convention […] provided the grounds for the failure to exhaust the domestic remedies,” because they had the legal obligation to indicate why the petitioner did not have access to these remedies or whether he had been prevented from exhausting them. In addition, the State indicated that the petition filed before the Commission stated expressly that “to date the family and his defense counsel have decided not to file any remedy in order to expedite the benefits that he may receive […] and, thus, he may be granted parole so that he is able to accede to the doctors required for his operation and prompt recovery.” According to the State, the Commission should have analyzed this statement, because the grounds for not filing the remedy were based on subjective situations of the petitioner and not on interference or obstruction by the State. 110. The State also referred to the subsidiary or complementary nature of the inter-American protection system and indicated that, in briefs of August 25, 2006, and January 9, May 3 and August 5 and 8, 2007, it had submitted arguments to the Commission affirming that the latter’s opinion – according to which the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was one of the State’s means of defense that could be waived, even tacitly – “could not be justified, because no State can tacitly waive its rights,” and “contradicts the spirit, purpose and reason of the [American] Convention.” The State indicated that, according to Articles 27 and 28 of its Rules of Procedure, “the Commission has the obligation and the responsibility to verify compliance with all the procedural requirements, […] before processing or considering a petition. With regard to the time frame for the presentation of petitions established in Article 46(1)(b), the State maintained that “the Commission must require petitioners to satisfy the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies in order to […] comply strictly with the peremptory time frame established in Article 32(1) of [its] Rules of Procedure,” because the infringement of this article would violate flagrantly the intention of the States when acceding to the American Convention. The State observed that the petition before the Commission was submitted on October 12, 2005, and “that, at that date, the Venezuelan courts were still hearing the proceedings against [Raúl José Díaz Peña], which proves the failure to exhaust domestic remedies and, consequently, the inadmissibility of the said petition.” On this basis, the State asked the Court to declare its disapproval of the Commission’s conduct, “insofar as it should not admit any case where it is evident that the petitioner has not exhausted the domestic remedies.” Arguments of the Commission 111. In response, the Commission argued that the filing of this objection was time-barred and asked the Court to declare it inadmissible because the arguments on which it was founded had not been submitted opportunely. The Commission maintained that, even though it is true that, at the admissibility stage before the Commission, the State had argued that the criminal proceedings were underway and that the domestic remedies had not been exhausted, this argument had been generic, without indicating any of the remedies proposed. Consequently, it corresponded to the Court to declare the preliminary objection irreceivable owing to its lack of precision at the appropriate procedural moment. In addition, the Commission noted that the arguments made by the State in its answering brief before the Court of May 24, 2011, “[had been] included in almost identical terms” in a brief submitted to the Commission on November 12, 2009, after the admissibility stage. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission also argued the substantial inadmissibility of the arguments submitted by the State on the preliminary objection and indicated that it was not consistent with the purpose of the case delimited by the Commission in the admissibility report, because this preliminary objection referred to the exhaustion of domestic remedies “in relation to allegations that had not been admitted by the Commission and that were not ruled on at the merits stage,” so that “its inadmissibility was evident.” 41