126. The representatives, 240 the State, and the Commission 241 asked the Court to rule explicitly on the conclusions reached by the Commission and the representatives in the Merits Report and in the pleadings and motions brief. In their opinion, this “would allow it to be inferred that the status of res judicata conferred on the acquittal of one of those accused of the murder of Jorge Omar Gutiérrez would deserve to be characterized as ‘fraudulent.’” They also asked that the Court rule “on the legal consequences arising from this in relation to the international obligations assumed by the Argentine State under the American Convention.” Also, based on the particularities of this case, they asked the Court “to rule on the inadmissibility of the provisions of the statute of limitations in relation to the investigation and punishment of the other perpetrators and masterminds of the extrajudicial execution of Jorge Omar Gutiérrez” (supra para. 17). 127. In this regard, the Court finds it necessary to reiterate that, in cases such as this one, it must rule on the conformity of the State’s actions with the American Convention. 242 128. Based on the foregoing, the Court considers that the provisions of Article 8(4) of the Convention, which state that “[a]n accused person acquitted by a non-appealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause,” forms part of the framework of the norms relating to a “fair trial” and to the guarantees of “due process,” established in the 240 The representatives argued that, owing to “the irregularities that surrounded the trial of one of the perpetrators of the death of Jorge Omar Gutiérrez […] the concept of ‘fraudulent res judicata’ was applicable.” During the public hearing and in their final written arguments, the representatives explained that, in the instant case, “there was no ‘real intention to subject the person responsible to justice,’” because, according to them: “[t]he investigation was marked by a significant corporate cover-up by the Argentine Federal Police with the support of the Police of the province of Buenos Aires in order to ensure impunity”; the said “maneuvers involved serious threats, illegal detentions, and the torture of witnesses[; n]o investigation of these facts had any success,” and “[t]he courts that intervened conducted a very flawed investigation, fraught with irregularities, to discover the motive for the crime, and to identify all those involved.” In addition, they asked the Court to establish that this case relates to an “extrajudicial execution committed by police agents, with institutional support and concealment, against another police agent who was willing to investigate criminal networks entrenched in the State, which has been left unpunished for almost 19 years,” so that it constituted a “gross violation of human rights that made investigation and punishment essential,” and it should be understood that the provisions of the statute of limitations that might be applied were inadmissible. In addition, they argued that a “considered decision in this case requires weighing the very serious effects on this family for almost a decade, and the impact on Argentine society of a crime of this nature, which involved active and substantial institutional concealment by federal law enforcement personnel and the [police of the province of Buenos Aires], remaining unpunished.” 241 During the public hearing and in its final written observations, the Commission asked the Court to establish the non-applicability of the statute of limitations in this case; on the one hand, because it relates to “a gross violation of human rights” and, on the other hand, because it is evident from “numerous acts and omissions that were deliberately aimed at obstructing the investigation and concealing responsibilities,” that the passage of time was determined by procedural acts and omissions designed, with evident bad faith or negligence, to promote or permit impunity. In addition, the Commission indicated that, in the context of this case, the court hearing the proceedings in which the federal police agent was acquitted, acted in order to remove the accused from criminal responsibility, and that there was no real intention to subject the person responsible to the action of justice. It also indicated that “the severity of the effects on the Gutiérrez family, owing to the impossibility of obtaining justice, in the face of an acquittal obtained in a way that was incompatible with the Convention, would not be justified by an absolute application of the guarantee of ne bis in idem in favor of [this] person, and any effects on the latter could be compensated by strict respect for due process of law and his right to a defend himself.” 242 In other words, in accordance with international customary law, according to which “[t]he characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law,” it corresponds to the Court to determine the legitimacy of the State’s actions pursuant to the provisions of the Convention. Cf. Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, annexed to resolution 56/83 adopted by the General Assembly [based on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/56/589 and Corr.1)]. Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, 85th plenary meeting, 12 December 2001, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 and corrigendum (A/56/10 and Corr.1 and 2). 2 Ibid. 48