temporal situation; namely, the date on which the Court’s contentious jurisdiction was accepted, in order to exclude such violations from this case. Consequently, the Court will now analyze the corresponding arguments under this heading. 35. The Court observes that the State seeks to prevent the Court from examining the human rights violations that took place prior to March 9, 1987 (the date on which Guatemala accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction), that are not continuing or permanent in nature and that do not persist to this day. Nevertheless, the State did not specify the violations to which it was referring. The Court reiterates that, like any organ with jurisdictional functions, it has the powers inherent in its attributes to determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The instruments of acceptance of the optional clause on the compulsory jurisdiction (Article 62(1) of the Convention) assume that the States submitting them accept the Court’s right to decide any dispute regarding its competence.15 36. In order to determine whether or not it has competence to hear a case or any aspect of it, in accordance with Article 62(1) of the American Convention, the Court must take into consideration the date on which the State accepted its jurisdiction, the terms of that acceptance, and the principle of non-retroactivity established in Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Even though the State is obliged to respect and to ensure the rights protected in the American Convention from the date on which it ratified the Convention, the Court’s competence to declare a violation of its provisions is regulated by the said acceptance by the State. 37. Guatemala accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction on March 9, 1987, and in its declaration indicated that the Court would have competence for the “cases following” the said acceptance (supra para. 15). Based on this and on the principle of non-retroactivity, the Court can examine acts or facts that have taken place after the date of the said acceptance16 and that have generated instantaneous and continuing or permanent human rights violations. Furthermore, the Court has competence to examine human rights violations that are continuing or permanent even though the initial act violating them took place before the date on which the Court’s contentious jurisdiction was accepted, if the said violations persist after the date of acceptance, because they continue to be committed; thus, the principle of non-retroactivity is not violated.17 38. Based on the foregoing, the Court has competence to examine the facts and the presumed human rights violations relating to the forced disappearances (infra Chapter IX); the absence of an impartial and effective investigation into the facts of this case (infra Chapter XII); the adverse effects on the personal integrity of the next of kin and survivors in relation to investigation of the facts (infra Chapter XIII); the failure to identify those who were executed and disappeared (infra Chapter XII); the “destruction of the community’s social fabric” (infra Chapter X and XI), and the forced displacement (infra Chapter XI). 15 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, paras. 16 and 17, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 27, 2012. Series C No. 240, para. 45. 16 Cf. Case of Blake v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections. Judgment of July 2, 1996. Series C No. 27, paras. 39 and 40, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 48. 17 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Preliminary objections. Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, paras. 65 and 66, and Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 48. 16