punish those responsible. The Commission added that the State’s inaction actually created an inhibitory effect, even forcing the displacement of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui to another location. Finally, the Commission pointed out that the State did not provide measures of protection in such cases, i.e. there were no programs or measures in place to protect witnesses, and that the measures offered were not consistent with the facts or the purpose for which they were conceived, since the State offered Luis Enrique Uzcátegui protection by the State police itself. 167. The representatives stated that, in addition to the moral and psychological damage inflicted on him by the death of Néstor José, Luis Enrique Uzcátegui suffered constant threats, harassment, and attacks against his life and integrity. In this regard, they pointed out that all the acts of harassment and threats were the result of his work as a human rights activist, initiated by his charges regarding the death of his brother Néstor José. The representatives also stated that in the context of persecution endured by the family, especially Luis Enrique Uzcátegui, it is reasonable to assume that anyone who was or is subjected to this situation may experience fear, anxiety, and distress about his life, thus violating the right to humane treatment. Noting that most of the actions against Luis Enrique Uzcátegui occurred when he was protected by precautionary or provisional measures, the representatives argued that such measures were not implemented, and therefore the State violated what they termed the “right to protection in situations of extreme gravity and urgency and the right to file a complaint before the Inter-American System” (Articles 63(2) in conjunction with Articles 44 and 13(1) of the American Convention), having failed to effectively discharge its duty to provide special protection in respect of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui. 168. The State presented no specific arguments on this matter, but said there were no threats because “the citizen Luis Uzcátegui continued to perform his activities related to human rights normally and continued informing the press.” Moreover, the State argued that it had fully complied with the provisional measures ordered by the Court, having made every effort to implement the measures of protection, despite the lack of cooperation from the beneficiary. A.4. Alleged violation of the freedom of expression of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui 169. The Commission argued that the death threats, physical attacks and the many acts of harassment committed by police officers of the State Falcón against Luis Enrique Uzcátegui, together with the State’s lack of action in this regard, certainly had an inhibiting effect on him, even causing him to move to another area, which implied, among other things, a violation of this right to freedom of thought and expression. 170. Furthermore, with respect to the criminal proceeding initiated against him for the crime of aggravated slander, the Commission argued that the domestic criminal norm invoked for this purpose is so ambiguous that it prevents any certainty and predictability about the prohibited conduct and the conduct protected by the right to freedom of expression.” It argued that “the mere fact of subjecting someone to a criminal process as a consequence of legitimately exercising his right to freedom of expression, violates this right.” It therefore considered that the State “violated the principle of legality enshrined in Articles 13(2) and 9 of the Convention”. The Commission also considered that the complaint filed against Luis Enrique Uzcátegui implied “a disproportionate use of criminal law […] to protect the honor of public servants from any accusations made against them for serious human rights violations.” It argued that Luis Enrique Uzcátegui’s statements “were made in the context of the exercise of his right to publicly complain and to do so before the competent 42