III. - Lack of authority 37. – For the same reason, it would not be possible to apply to the institution of provisional measures "the theory of inherent powers" since they, by their very nature, were conceived as powers that an international organization requires to comply with the roles not provided for, but, in its base Convention or constituent Treaty 42 and thus such powers must be understood to be granted. In contrast, these powers are expressly awarded to the Court, and are therefore “explicit”, they are found in Article 63(2) of the Convention and must be adhered to, which is the rule that should be applied or, if appropriate, interpreted. Therefore, it is not possible to apply the "theory of implicit powers" principle to such measures, as, in contrast, occurred with the provisions in the report submitted by the Court to the OAS General Assembly, where, based on the provisions of the Convention43 and the Statute of the Court,44 the monitoring of compliance with judgments45 was established in the Rules of Procedure and is thus a procedural institution.46 38.- Nor would it be appropriate to invoke the pro homine principle, at least in the way it is enshrined in the Convention47, to justify the adoption of provisional measures after the issuance of the judgment on merits, for, although this principle refers to the "rights" of persons recognized therein, such measures are conceived as a power of the Court.48 Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that, if an application included that principle with regard to the latter, it would be referring to the fact that the rule that regulates it should be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, which is, to avoid the irreparable damage that a person involved in a contentious case could suffer, during the proceeding before the Court, where the judgment is expected to avoid or repair the damage definitively. 42 Cour Internationale de Justice. Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies. Avis Consultatif du 11 avril 1949: “[d]e l'avis de la Cour, l’ [O] rganisation était destinée à exercer des fonctions et à jouir de droits - et elle l'a fait - qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que si l'Organisation possède une large mesure de personnalité internationale et la capacité d'agir sur le plan international. Elle est actuellement le type le plus élevé d'organisation internationale, et elle ne pourrait répondre aux intentions de ses fondateurs si elle était dépourvue de la personnalité internationale. On doit admettre que ses Membres, en lui assignant certaines fonctions, avec les devoirs et les responsabilités qui les accompagnent, l'ont revêtue de la compétence nécessaire pour lui permettre de s'acquitter effectivement de ces fonctions.” 43 Arts. 65 and 68 of the Convention. 44 Article 30 of the Court’s Statute. 45 Article 60 of the Convention. 46 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Jurisdiction. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 100: “[t]he legal grounds for the authority of the Inter-American Court to supervise compliance with its decisions is to be found in Articles” 33, 62.1, 62(3) and 65 of the Convention. 47 Article 29 of the Convention. 48 Cf. Matter of Certain Venezuelan Prisons. Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela. Order of July 6, 2011, Considering paragraph 4: “Article 63(2) of the Convention requires that for the Court to be able to order provisional measures three conditions must be present: (i) “extreme gravity”; (ii) “urgency,” and (iii) the need “to avoid irreparable damage to persons.” These three conditions must coexist and be present in any situation in which the Court’s intervention is requested. Likewise, the three conditions described must persist in order for the Court to maintain the protection ordered. If one of them ceases to be present, the Court must assess the appropriateness of continuing with the protection ordered.” 10