4 legislative or other measures necessary in order to bring the Barbadian Constitution and domestic laws on the death penalty into compliance with the American Convention. Given these common orders against the same State, as well as the fact that the same parties represent the victims in both cases,6 the Court finds it appropriate to issue a single Order analyzing the State's compliance with both of the Judgments mentioned. A. ORDERS COMMON TO THE BOYCE AND DACOSTA CADOGAN CASES A.1. The obligation to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty does not contravene the American Convention, and in particular, that is not imposed through mandatory sentencing (Operative Paragraph seven of the Boyce Judgment); and to ensure that the laws of Barbados, particularly Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act, are brought into compliance with the Convention (Operative Paragraph nine of the DaCosta Cadogan Judgment) 9. The Court notes, as a preliminary matter, that Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act of Barbados imposes the death penalty for the crime of murder through mandatory sentencing7 and was found to be contrary to the Convention in both the Boyce8 and DaCosta Cadogan9 cases. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to analyze Operative Paragraph seven of the former Judgment, which requires the repeal of the mandatory death penalty, together with Operative Paragraph nine of the latter Judgment, which requires this repeal through the amendment of Section 2 of the abovementioned Act. 10. With respect to the Boyce case, the State reported that it had decided to abolish the mandatory aspect of the death penalty. To this end, the State indicated that it intended to institute legislative changes and that it would forward evidence of these changes to the Court as soon as they became available. However, in its report on compliance with the DaCosta Cadogan Judgment, the State indicated that a “Committee to Study the Ramifications of Repealing Section 26 of the Constitution” (hereinafter, “Committee”) had been formed in order to consider, inter alia, the legislative changes necessary to repeal the mandatory death penalty. In a meeting held on October 14, 2010, the Committee considered three draft bills.10 According to the State, these would require, among other things, “endorsement by the Attorney General, approval by the Cabinet, acceptance and enactment into law by the Parliament, and promulgation by the Governor General” in order to become law. Additionally, the State noted that the draft legislation would provide for “the judicial determination of [the] sentence of any person who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death prior to the date of entry into force of [what is now] draft legislation. 6 Saul Lehrfreund and Parvais Jabbar of the Law Firm of Simons Muirhead & Burton represent the victims in both the Boyce and DaCosta Cadogan cases. In the case of DaCosta Cadogan, the victim was also represented by Alair Shepherd Q.C., Douglas Mendez S.C., Tariq Khan, Ruth Brander, and Alison Gerry. 7 That is, it establishes the death penalty as the only possible sentence for the crime of murder and does not allow the imposition of a lesser sentence in consideration of the particular characteristics of the crime or the participation and degree of culpability of the defendant. Cf. Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2007. Series C No. 169, para. 57. 8 Cf. Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, supra note 7, para. 72. 9 Cf. Case of DaCosta Cadogan v. Barbados. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 24, 2009. Series C No. 204, para. 51. 10 The “Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2010,” the “Offences Against the Person (Amendment) Bill, 2010,” and the “Penal System Reform (Amendment) Bill, 2010.”