CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE EDUARDO VIO GROSSI. I concur with the Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICourtHR) of this date on the request for provisional measures submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) with regard to the Republic of Peru, in the matter of Wong Ho Wing. Nevertheless, I find it necessary to make the following additional observations: 1. It should be recalled that, since provisional measures are admissible in cases of extreme gravity and urgency and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons – in other words, in exceptional circumstances, which are inherently dynamic and changing – the relevant powers of the CourtIDH are not preclusive. This implies, on the one hand, that if the Court does not grant them, they can be requested again and, on the other, that if it does grant them, there is no legal impediment for the Court to modify them subsequently, ex officio, or at the request of the party, based on new information concerning the modification or extinction of the above-mentioned requisites. 2. Regarding the preventive aspect in the instant matter – consisting in the risk that if the extradition is granted the death penalty will be applied to the person extradited – the above signifies, for example, that, at some time in the future should the measures decreed in this Order be annulled, the requested State could provide enhanced guarantees in relation to the requesting State’s undertaking that, if the extradition is granted, it will respect the right to life and, in view of the observations that follow, to due process of the individual in question, in the terms of the Pact of San José, even though it is not a party thereto. 3. With regard to the protective effect in this matter – relating to the fact that if the extradition is granted, the inter-American system would not be able to exercise its powers with regard to the said individual, because he would be in a country that is not subject to its jurisdiction – it is appropriate to note that the ICourtHR itself must assess, prima facie, the grounds both for the petition lodged with the IACHR and for the requisites of the provisional measures requested concerning a matter that has not yet been submitted to its consideration, to enable it to determine the conjunction of all the requisites for such measures to be admissible. Consequently, the Court is not bound by what the IACHR could have decided in this regard because, if this were so, in the final analysis, it would be the IACHR rather than the CourtIDH that would decide on the adoption of such measures. 4. In summary, if it were sought to limit the Court’s said powers with regard to provisional measures in cases such as this one, on the grounds that, when deciding to adopt such measures, it would not have competence to rule on the merits of the petition lodged with the IACHR - namely, the violation of the rights to life and to due process – this would mean that the CourtIDH would not have autonomy to determine and to assess, in exercise of its exclusive authority, the conjunction of the requisites for ordering the said measures, because, in the end, it would have no alternative but to find that the mere request of the IACHR was sufficient and, consequently, to order the measures requested, which would evidently circumvent the letter and spirit of the provisions of Article 63(2) of the Pact of San José. 5. On another subject, I should add that provisional measures are, essentially, of an extraordinary nature, because they are admissible only and exclusively in cases of extreme