actually carried out, but merely pointed out that the testimonies had been received in Puerto Bolívar. Regarding the foregoing, Mr. Grijalva emphasized that the testimonies were given in Puerto Bolívar in the Port Captaincy, and that the procedure took place without the presence of his lawyer, or of the other defendant and his attorney. 110. This Court notes that, according to the facts, Mr. Grijalva’s defense was not able to exercise its right to cross-examine the witnesses and, therefore, could not exercise the respective control over the content of their statements, which served as the basis for the conviction handed down in the military criminal proceedings. The Court has pointed out that among the prerogatives that must be granted to someone who has been accused is the opportunity to examine witnesses against and in his favor, under the same conditions, for the purpose of exercising his defense, which materializes the principles of adversarial and procedural equality.98 The Court further notes that the mere presence of the defense lawyer in such proceedings is an indispensable guarantee for the exercise of the right of defense through the control of the content of the statements rendered. 111. Consequently, this Court considers that the State violated the right of the defense to cross-examine the witnesses and to control the content of their statements, which were decisive in determining the alleged victim’s guilt, thereby violating the right of the defense to examine witnesses, enshrined in Article 8(2)(f) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Grijalva Bueno. A.2.3. Scope of the presumption of innocence and the duty to state the grounds for a decision 112. Based on the Commission’s allegations regarding the treatment and assessment of the evidence by the judge, it appears that: i) the conviction judgment did not assess the evidence in light of the principle of the presumption of innocence, given that it did not state the reasons why several elements of exculpatory evidence should not be taken into account, and ii) the conviction was based exclusively on the report of the commission of the Inspector General of the Navy; it did not analyze the use of torture and coercion against several persons who testified against Mr. Grijalva, and no measure was adopted according to the standards related to the exclusionary rule. For its part, the State argued that the rulings issued by the military jurisdiction contain a clear description of the facts and their relationship to the evidence presented during the proceedings, are consistent with the criminal law through a reasoned argument, and are in line with the parameters established by the Court. 113. Thus, in order to resolve the dispute, it is necessary to determine whether, in accordance with the standards of due process established in Article 8 of the American Convention, the principle of presumption of innocence and the duty to state reasons for judicial decisions issued against the alleged victim were violated. The Court will now analyze these matters. 114. This Court has indicated that under Article 8(2) of the Convention, the principle of presumption of innocence “requires that a person cannot be convicted unless there is clear evidence of his criminal liability. If the evidence presented is incomplete or insufficient, he must be acquitted, not convicted.”99 The Court recalls that “[a] lack of Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 154, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 449. 99 Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 120, and Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 122. 98 29