guarantee of reasonable time was met, namely: a) the complexity of the matter, b) the procedural activity of the interested party, c) the conduct of the judicial authorities, and d) the effect produced on the legal situation of the person involved in the process.123 142. In the instant case, the State did not invoke specific or substantive information to justify the prolongation of the proceedings. Furthermore, with regard to the procedural activity of the alleged victim, the State is reminded that this Court has stated “that the filing of appeals constitutes an objective factor which should not be attributed either to the alleged victim or to the respondent State, but should be taken as an objective element when determining whether the duration of the proceeding exceeded the reasonable time limit.”124 143. For the corresponding analysis it should be noted that, according to Article 167 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure, a criminal trial consists of two phases: summary and plenary. In this case, the first phase began with the order to investigate an alleged crime and ended with the judgment of the Zone Commander. The second phase began with the referral of the case to the Court of Military Justice by virtue of the remedies granted (appeal, annulment) or by reason of having been referred for consultation; there was also the possibility of appealing the summons to a full trial before the Court of Military Justice, in accordance with the supplementary rules of the criminal procedure. 144. Regarding the complexity of the matter, the instant case did not contain elements of complexity, since it involved only two defendants, both duly identified and localized. As for the procedural activity of the interested parties, the Court notes that there is no evidence that Mr. Grijalva or his representatives carried out actions that hindered the progress of the military criminal proceedings. 145. Regarding the conduct of the judicial authorities, in this case, the order to open an investigation was issued on June 15, 1994, and approximately two years later, on July 2, 1996, the criminal judge declared the plenary phase concluded and ordered the case files to be sent to the military judge of the First Naval Zone. On August 7, 1996, the military judge of the First Naval Zone issued a summons to a trial against Mr. Grijalva and another defendant who, on August 8 of the same year, filed an appeal against said decision. On September 2, 1996, the court referred the case to the Court of Military Justice and almost two years later, on June 5, 1998, the Military Court of Justice rejected the appeal and upheld the order of summons to a trial. Finally, two years later, on March 13, 2000, the military judge of the First Naval Zone issued a conviction, six years after the start of the military criminal proceedings. The defendants appealed this judgment on March 15 of the same year. One year later, on March 13, 2001, the Court of Military Justice issued a judgment in which it dismissed the appeal and confirmed all parts of the judgment of March 13, 2000. This Court considers that the State did not invoke substantive or acceptable reasons to justify the prolongation of the proceedings, nor did it act with due diligence to ensure justice. Thus, it is pertinent to consider that the time elapsed of seven years and two months constitutes a prolonged delay in the military criminal proceedings attributable to the State. Series C No. 270, para. 403, and Case of Guzmán Albarracín et al, v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 181. 123 Cf. Case of Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, para. 77, and Case of Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 181. 124 Cf. Case of Memoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 174, and Case of Montesinos Mejía v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 184. 37