reestablishing the situation prior to the violation. If this is not feasible, as occurs in the majority of cases of human rights violations, the Court may order measures to protect the violated rights and repair the harm caused by the violations.136 In view of this situation, the Court has considered the need to provide different types of reparation so as to fully redress the damage; therefore, in addition to pecuniary compensation, other measures such as satisfaction, restitution, rehabilitation, and guarantees of nonrepetition have special relevance due to the severity of the harm caused.137 165. The Court has established that reparations must have a causal nexus with the facts of the case, the violations declared, the damage proven, and the measures requested to redress the respective harm. Therefore, the Court must analyze the concurrence of these factors in order to rule appropriately and according to the law.138 166. Taking into account the violations of the American Convention declared in the previous chapters, and in light of the criteria established in the Court’s case law concerning the nature and scope of the obligation to make reparation,139the Court will examine the claims presented by the Commission, together with the corresponding arguments of the State, in order to establish measures aimed at redressing those violations.140 A. Injured party 167. Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Convention, this Court considers that anyone who has been declared a victim of the violation of any right recognized therein is an injured party. In this case, the Court considers that Mr. Vicente Aníbal Grijalva Bueno is the “injured party” and, as the victim of the violations declared in Chapter VIII, he will be the beneficiary of the reparations ordered by the Court. B. Measures of restitution 168. The Commission requested Mr. Grijalva Bueno’s reinstatement in a position of equal rank to the one that he would currently hold, had he not been discharged. If the victim should decide that he does not wish to be reinstated, or if there are objective reasons that prevent his reinstatement, the State must pay compensation in this regard, which should be separate from the reparations related to pecuniary and moral damage. 169. The State indicated that, regardless of Mr. Grijalva Bueno’s wishes, in this case it would be materially impossible to reinstate him in the same position, since approximately 27 years have elapsed since his discharge from the Navy. In any case, Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 24, and Case of Vicky Hernández et al. v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 145. 137 Cf. Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C No. 211, para. 226, and Case of Vicky Hernández v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 145. 138 Cf. Case of Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 110, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of October 6, 2020. Series C No. 412, para. 149. 139 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and costs, supra, paras. 25 to 27, and Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, supra, para. 150. 140 In this regard, the Court points out that although the representative of Mr. Grijalva Bueno presented a series of claims for reparations in his final written arguments, these claims are not admissible, since the proper procedural moment for submitting them was with the pleadings and motions brief, which was presented extemporaneously (supra, para. 7). 136 43