28. Notwithstanding the above, the Court assesses positively the decisions of the domestic courts that heard the application for constitutional protection filed by several individuals and the organization that represents the victims. The Constitutional Court of Colombia, in its judgment T-367 of May 11, 2010, analyzed whether the defendant State organs and institutions “violated the rights to a decent life and to justice, by requiring the registration in the Displaced Population Information System (SIPOD), of the petitioners, victims of the violent events that occurred in the villages of La Granja in 1996 and El Aro in 1997, of the municipality of Ituango, recognized in the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as displaced by the violence, as a requirement for access to some of the measures of reparation established in the Judgment of July 1, 2006, delivered by the Inter-American Court.” In its ruling that protects the rights to a decent life and to justice, the Colombian Constitutional Court found as follows: Based on this declaration (the Inter-American Court) sentenced the Colombian State to comply with a series of measures of reparation, indicated in the previous table, the essential purpose of which is full restitution, understood as the re-establishment of the situation prior to the violation. It has not been possible to comply with the essential elements of this restitution, based on events that took place 12 and 13 years ago, and ordered more than three years ago by the Inter-American Court – obligations concerning health care, housing and safety – because the State entities responsible for attending to and protecting the displaced population have demanded compliance with additional requirements established in domestic laws in order to access the measures of reparation established by the Inter-American Court, specifically registration in the Displaced Population Information System (SIPOD). The Review Chamber finds that this course of action disregarded: (i) Article 68(1) of the American Convention, which stipulates that “[t]he States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.” To this end, the State must ensure implementation at the national level of the Court’s decisions in its judgments. (ii) The final and non-appealable nature of the judgments of the Inter-American Court, which, according to Article 67 of the American Convention, must be complied with by the State fully and promptly. (iii) Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which establishes that a State Party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty; and that the treaty-based obligations of the States Parties are binding for all the powers and organs of the State; (iv) The obligation of the States Parties to the Convention to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Convention and their inherent effects within their respective domestic laws. This principle is applicable not only with regard to the substantive norms of human rights treaties (that is those which contain provisions concerning the protected rights), but also with regard to procedural norms, such as those referring to compliance with the decisions of the Court, and (v) The commitment acquired by the Colombian State when accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, on June 21, 1985, to comply with its decisions and to ensure their implementation in the domestic sphere, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the American Convention. The Court observes that, during the three years that have passed since the Inter-American Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment, numerous obstacles have prevented significant progress in compliance with the judgment, originating mainly from errors of assessment and interpretation by the different officials with responsibilities in the area of forced displacement. Among the most relevant are: the transfer of some of the obligations of the State to the victims’ representatives, including the localization of the victims, the establishment of their needs and requirements, and the elaboration of lists for different purposes, including as a prior requirement for access to the measures of reparation that the Court had accorded them. A decisive role has also been played by the fact that, in order to comply with these measures, the contribution of many entities is required and the agenda and institutional commitments of the latter end up by postponing the priority attention required by the displaced population owing to their special situation of vulnerability and lack of protection. This Chamber finds that the main obligation of the State is to devise the measures required to locate the displaced persons and, consequently, it is not admissible that public officials adduce the failure of those petitioning on behalf of the victims to provide information in order to postpone, indefinitely, compliance 12