presumed victim characterized as “inappropriate touching” constitutes sexual violence or rape. On the other, a dispute exists as to the characterization of the facts as torture. 358. Following in the steps of international jurisprudence, and taking into account the provisions of the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Court has considered that sexual violence is constituted by acts of a sexual nature committed on a person without their consent that, in addition to encompassing the physical invasion of the human body, could include acts that do not involve penetration or even any physical contact. 513 359. Furthermore, pursuant to current jurisprudential and normative criteria in the sphere of both international criminal law and comparative criminal law, this Court has considered that rape does not necessarily entail non-consensual vaginal sex, as it was traditionally deemed. Rape should also be understood as acts of vaginal or anal penetration, without the consent of the victim, using other parts of the perpetrator’s body or objects, as well as oral penetration by the male organ. 514 In this regard, the Court clarifies that, in order for an act to be considered rape, it is sufficient that penetration, however slight, occurs, as described above. 515 In addition, it must be understood that vaginal penetration refers to penetration by any part of the perpetrator’s body or by objects of any genital opening, including the labia majora and labia minora, as well as the vaginal orifice. This interpretation is in keeping with the concept that any type of penetration, however slight, is sufficient for an act to be considered rape. The Court understands that rape is a form of sexual 516 violence. 360. In the instant case, the Court has already established that Ms. J. was subjected to sexual “touching” at the time of her arrest by a male State agent, taking into account: (1) Ms. J.’s statements before the domestic authorities: (2) the similarity of what Ms. J. described and the context of sexual violence verified by the CVR at the time of the facts; (3) the difficulty of proving this type of fact; (4) the presumption of truth that should be accorded to this type of complaint, which can be disproved by a series of procedures, investigations and guarantees that were not implemented in this case where no proof to the contrary was submitted, because (5) there are certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutor of the Public Prosecution Service; (6) the 513 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 306. See also, Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 119, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 109. See also, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment of 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 688. 514 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 310. 515 Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Judgment of 10 December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 185; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment of 22 February 2001, Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, paras. 437 and 438; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 12 June 2002, Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, para. 127. Also, the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has indicated, in order to define the crime against humanity of rape and the war crime of rape, that rape occurs when “the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.” Cf. Elements of Crimes, 9 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part-II-B), Article 7 (1) (g)-1 and Article 8 (2) (e) vi)-1. Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf. Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et al., Judgment of 2 March 2009, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, paras. 145 and 146. This interpretation was also used by the CVR in its report, that “understand rape as a form of sexual violence that occurs when the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by a conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. This invasion must have been committed by force, or by the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.” Cf. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume VI, chapter 1.5, p. 265. 516 In this regard, see Article 2 of the Convention of Belém do Pará; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment of 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 688. 107