239 Consequently, even accepting that the decree mean that they will be entirely inapplicable. suspending guarantees was in force, the Court must analyze the proportionality of the actions taken by the State authorities when detaining Ms. J. 142. First, the Court emphasizes that, since the constitutional guarantee concerning the time for bringing a person before a judge was suspended, it is not necessary to analyze the alleged failure to comply with the time frame established in the Constitution. Despite this, it is pertinent to clarify that, after examining the evidence submitted, the Court does not have sufficient information to 240 Therefore, know whether Ms. J.’s detention lasted more than the 15 days alleged by the State. for the effects of this Judgment, the Court will consider that Ms. J. remained at least 15 days without being brought before a judge. 143. In this regard, the Court recalls that the first part of Article 7(5) of the Convention establishes that the detention of a person must be subject to prompt judicial review. The Court has indicated that prompt judicial control is a measure tending to avoid the arbitrary or illegal nature of detentions, bearing in mind that, under the rule of law, it is for the judge to guarantee the rights of the detainee, to authorize the adoption of precautionary measures, or coercive measures when strictly necessary and, in general, to ensure that the accused is treated in a way that is consequent with the presumption of innocence. 241 Prompt judicial review of the detention is particularly relevant 242 Even though this right was suspended, this when applied to arrests made without a court order. suspension cannot be absolute and, therefore, the Court must analyze the proportionality of what 243 happened in this case. 144. The meaning of the expression “promptly” must be examined in light of the particular circumstances of the specific case. Thus, the investigation in cases of terrorism may present the authorities with special problems, and these must be taken into account when analyzing the 244 Nevertheless, in this case, it has been proved that Ms. J. “prompt” presentation before a judge. was not brought before a judge for at least 15 days (supra para. 142), while the case file does not include any well-founded reasons for this delay in submitting Ms. J.’s detention to a judge. The Court considers that, even under the suspension of guarantees, the proportionality of Ms. J. 239 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 29, States of emergency (Article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, para. 4. See also, IACHR, Asencios Lindo et al. v. Peru, Report No. 49/00 of April 13, 2000, para. 85. 240 First, the Court recalls that there is no dispute between the parties that the initial arrest of Ms. J. occurred on April 13, 1992. Also, the DINCOTE Detainees Register indicates that Ms. J. left the said center on April 28, 1992 (supra paras. 80, 82 and 94). That same day, the DINCOTE forwarded police attestation No. 084 to the prosecutor and made Ms. J. available to him as a detainee for the crime of terrorism, an arrest warrant was issued against Ms. J., and a preliminary investigation in the ordinary jurisdiction was opened against the presumed victim (supra para. 97). However, there are no records of where J. was from April 28 to 30, because, according to the records of the Miguel Castro Castro National Penitentiary Institute, the presumed victim entered this center on April 30, 1992 (supra para. 94). Furthermore, the representative provided as documentary evidence a sworn statement by Emma Vigueras, the lawyer of others accused in the same judicial proceeding as the presumed victim, questioning the truth of the contents of the official documents, in the sense that, on April 28, Ms. J. and the other persons detained in the said proceeding were “still at the DINCOTE and without the judge [having been] able to make any assessment of the facts. Sworn statement of Emma Vigueras of May 15, 2000 (file of annexes to the motions and arguments brief, annex 2, folio 3010). 241 Cf. Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 129, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para. 61. 242 para. 88. Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, 243 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, paras. 109 to 111. See also, ECHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 78, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI. 244 Mutatis mutandi, ECHR, Brogan and Others. v. The United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, § 61, Series A No. 145-B; Brannigan and McBride v. The United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, § 58, Series A no. 258-B, and Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 78, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI. 46