and that they are kept private only exceptionally, “to preserve the interests of justice.” In the instant case, the State has not proved the need and proportionality of the restriction of the guarantee of the public nature of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court concludes that the application, as a general rule, of the private nature of the proceedings against Ms. J. until the 2003 legislative reform violated Article 8(5) of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to the detriment of Ms. J., inasmuch as the violation resulted from a legal norm in force at the time of the facts. B.1.4) The absence of reasoning and the presumption of innocence in the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of December 27, 1993 i. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 221. The Commission considered that the Supreme Court of Justice had failed to comply with the obligation to provide its reasoning in its decision of December 27, 1993, because “it did not give any explanation of the reasons” for the decision; “nor did it explain which facts had not been duly evaluated, or […] indicate why the evidence had not been assessed adequately.” According to the Commission, the Supreme Court of Justice “failed to provide an individualized reasoning with regard to the situation of Ms. J.,” bearing in mind that the proceedings included a large number of persons for diverse acts, with different evidence and charges. In addition, the Commission argued that, in this case, “it was particularly relevant for the judicial authority to provide the reasoning that substantiated its ruling, because this entailed the declaration of the nullity of an acquittal for which important arguments had been made concerning the existence of a reasonable doubt about Ms. J.’s criminal responsibility”; consequently, the absence of reasoning also constituted non-compliance with the principle of the presumption of innocence. The Commission indicated that “the legal grounds are unknown, […] there is no information as to whether one of the parties had filed an appeal and that is why the Supreme Court [decided] to issue this ruling.” 222. The representative argued that the judgment declaring the nullity of the acquittal “made no mention of substantiation or reason […] or referred to any legal basis for the ruling. Nor did it mention under which norm (paragraph) of the Code of Criminal Procedures it had made its ruling on nullity. […] The grounds are specific and restrictive.” According to the representative, the Supreme Court “could not consider the facts that had been established or deny them indicating ‘that the evidence had not been assessed correctly,’ especially without providing the reasoning for this position’; while the grounds for annulment entail “serious irregularities, omission of procedures or omission of guarantees,” none of which was indicated as the grounds for the declaration of nullity. 223. The State indicated that “regardless of whether the ruling issued was duly reasoned,” “the said ruling no longer has any legal effect,” owing to the case law of the Constitutional Court […] and Legislative Decree No. 926, which “should be considered as a measure of reparation.” It also argued that “if the petitioner and the Commission consider that the judgment of December 27, 1993, is contrary to the provisions of due process and, therefore, invalid, the same is true of the judgment of June 18, 1993, which acquitted her.” ii. Considerations of the Court 224. The Court has indicated that the reasoning is the exteriorization of the rational justification that allows a conclusion to be reached. 332 The obligation to provide the reasoning for decisions is a guarantee related to the conscientious administration of justice that guarantees the individual the right to be tried for the reasons established by law, while providing credibility to judicial decisions in 332 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 107, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 141. 66