form of torture. Furthermore, this right is recognized in numerous international instruments that reiterate the same prohibition, 420 and even in international humanitarian law. 421 305. Before examining the ill-treatment presumably inflicted on Ms. J., and its legal definition, this Court deems it pertinent to recall its case law concerning the criteria applicable to the assessment of evidence in a case such as this one. Starting with its first contentious case, the Court has indicated that, for an international court, the criteria for the assessment of the evidence are less rigid than under the domestic legal systems, and has affirmed that it is able to assess the evidence freely. 422 The Court must make an assessment of the evidence that takes into account the gravity of attributing international responsibility to a State and that, despite this, is able to establish with confidence the truth of the facts that have been alleged. 423 In order to establish that there has been a violation of the rights embodied in the Convention it is not necessary to prove the responsibility of the State beyond all reasonable doubt, or to identify, individually, the agents to whom the violations are attributed; 424 rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that acts and omissions have been verified that have permitted the perpetration of those violations or that the State had an obligation with which it has failed to comply. 425 306. The Court also recalls that it is legitimate to use circumstantial evidence, indications and presumptions as grounds for a judgment, provided that consistent conclusions with regard to the facts can be inferred from them. 426 In this regard, the Court has indicated that, in principle, the burden of proof concerning the facts on which the allegations are based falls on the plaintiff; however, it has emphasized that, contrary to domestic criminal law, in proceedings on human rights violations, the State’s defense cannot be based on the impossibility of the plaintiff to provide evidence when it is the State that controls the means to clarify facts that occurred on its territory. 427 307. Taking into account these criteria for the assessment of the body of evidence, this Court will now determine: (C) what happened during the initial arrest and its legal definition, and (D) what happened during the detention of Ms. J. in the DINCOTE, and its respective legal definition. Subsequently, the Court will rule on (E) other presumed violations of personal integrity alleged by the representative and the Commission. 420 Cf. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention of Imprisonment, Principles 1 and 6; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, article 5; 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, article 4, and Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism, Guideline IV. 421 Cf., inter alia, Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III), articles 49, 52, 87, 89 and 97; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV), articles 40, 51, 95, 96, 100 and 119; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), article 75.2.a.ii), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), article 4.2.a). See also, Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para. 71. 422 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, paras. 127 and 128, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 156. 423 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 129, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 156. 424 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra, para. 91; Case of González Medina and family members v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 27, 2012. Series C No. 240, para. 133, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 162. 425 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, paras. 172 and 173, and Case of Luna López v. Honduras, supra, para. 119. 426 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 130, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 156. 427 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 135, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 156. 89