376. Regarding the fact that the presumed victim was kept incommunicado, this Court has already indicated that under international human rights law it has been established that incommunicado must be exceptional and that its use during detention may constitute an act contrary to human dignity, 532 because it may result in a situation of extreme mental and moral suffering for the detainee. 533 Similarly, as of its first judgment, the Inter-American Court has considered that prolonged isolation and coercive incommunicado represent, in themselves, forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the mental and moral integrity of the individual, and of the right of all those detained to the respect due to the dignity inherent in the human being. 534 Furthermore, State must ensure that those deprived of liberty may have contact with the members of their family. 535 The Court also notes that the Procedural Norms for police investigations, the preliminary investigation, and the prosecution of offenses committed for terrorist purposes, in force at the time of Ms. J.’s detention in the DINCOTE, stipulated that: If essential for the elucidation of the offense, the provincial prosecutor shall request the corresponding investigating judge to authorize that the detainee be kept incommunicado for no more than ten days. Incommunicado does not prevent private conversations between the defense counsel and the detainee, which may not be prohibited by the police authority in any case, and does not require prior authorization, informing the provincial prosecutor.536 377. The Court notes that Ms. J. has stated that “all the time [she] was in the DINCOTE, she was incommunicado.” 537 Likewise, J.’s mother and Emma Vigueras indicated that, while J. was in the DINCOTE, she was kept incommunicado and her lawyer could only see her once without being able to speak with her in private. 538 The State did not submit any evidence in this regard. 378. The Court notes that the evidence provided by the parties reveals that, during her detention 539 Ms. J. only had contact with her defense in the DINCOTE and at least as of April 16, 1992, 540 The Court also stresses that, while she was detained counsel at the time of her police statement. in the DINCOTE, the presumed victim did not have contact with her family. The State has not proved that, in the instant case, it was essential to subject J. to the said incommunicado, or that this was implemented pursuant to domestic law. In this regard, the Court recalls that 532 127. Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 82, and Case of De La Cruz Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 533 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 90, and Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 127. 534 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, supra, para. 87, and Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 127. 535 Cf. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Communications Nos. 222/98 and 229/99 (2003), para. 44. 536 Law No. 24,700, Procedural norms for police investigations, the preliminary investigation, and the prosecution of offenses committed for terrorist purposes, article 2 (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 5, folio 3244). 537 Preliminary statement of June 15, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 42, folio 3709). 538 J.’s mother testified that “[d]uring the 17 days [that J. was detained in the DINCOTE], she was kept in total incommunicado. [She] was unable to see her. Only one lawyer was able to visit her, but was unable to speak to her in private.” Affidavit prepared by J.’s mother on June 13, 2006, for the case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison (file of annexes to the motions and arguments brief, annex 1, folio 3000). Meanwhile, Emma Vigueras testified that “the DINCOTE kept [Ms. J. and other detainees] incommunicado.” Sworn statement made by Emma Vigueras on May 15, 2000 (file of annexes to the motions and arguments brief, annex 2, folio 3009). 539 According to the record of the search of Ms. J.’s home on April 16, 1992, she and her younger sister were present for this search. Cf. Record of house search of April 16, 1992 (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 26, folio 3651). 540 The Court notes that, the record of the search executed on April 16, 1992, establishes that the search was carried out in the presence of Ms. J. and her younger sister, and that both had signed it. The record does not establish that the owner of the building, J.’s mother, was present during the operation. However, it indicates that the owner had refused to sign. Therefore, it is unclear whether Ms. J. had seen her mother on that occasion, especially considering that this would contradict the statement by her mother supra (para. 377). 112