whole search, a matter that will be examined infra (paras. 338 and 339), the representative did not specifically challenge this aspect of her statement during the public hearing or at any other procedural stage. Therefore, the Court considers that it has insufficient evidence to declare that the State failed to comply with this element of the obligation contained in Article 7(4) of the Convention. 151. Regarding the obligation to notify the charges brought against Ms. J. promptly and in writing, the Court recalls that this obligation exists, even if the prosecutor from the Public Prosecution Service did advise Ms. J. verbally of the reasons for her detention. In the instant case, the acts relating to compliance with this obligation are related to the duty to inform the accused of 258 so that they will be analyzed the charges brought against her included in Article 8(2)(b), together (infra paras. 194 to 201). A.3 The failure to register Ms. J.’s detention 152. This Court notes that it is unclear where J. was from April 28 to 30, and also from April 13 to 15, 1992 (supra paras. 92, 94 and 142). In this regard, the Court has considered that any detention, irrespective of the reason or its duration, must be duly registered in the pertinent document, indicating clearly, at least, the reasons for the detention, who executed it, the time of detention and the time of release, as well as a record that the competent judge was advised, in 259 order to protect the physical liberty of the individual against any illegal or arbitrary interference. 260 Moreover, The Court has established that this obligation also exists in police detention centers. the Court notes that the registration of the detention is even more important when this is carried out without a court order and during a state of emergency, as in the instant case. This obligation is also established in the laws of Peru (supra para. 129). Consequently, the failure to register Ms. J.’s detention over the period mentioned constitutes a violation of the rights embodied in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument. A.4 The preventive detention of the presumed victim between April 30, 1992, and June 18, 1993, as well as its relationship to the principle of the presumption of innocence A.4.1) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 153. The Commission considered that “the preventive detention of Ms. J. was arbitrary because it lacked an individualized justification of the procedural objectives that it sought,” and also because “article 13(a) of Decree 25,475 of May 5, 1992, [… had been applied to her,] as of its entry into force, [which] established the obligatory deprivation of liberty during the preliminary investigation stage ‘with no exceptions.’” 154. The representative did not present additional arguments to those mentioned regarding the alleged violation of the right not to be detained arbitrarily and to be brought promptly before a judge or judicial authority (supra para. 134). 155. The State argued that, according to the Court’s case law, “preventive detention is authorized when this ensures the efficient implementation of the investigation; in other words, it prevents the accused from obstructing or evading the action of justice, destroying evidence, or colluding with 258 Similarly, see, Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, paras. 224 to 227. 259 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 53, and Case of García and family members v. Guatemala, supra, para. 100. 260 Cf. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 131. 49