argued that, from April 13, 1992, when Ms. J. was detained, “until August 12, 1992, the date on which Decree-Law No. 25,659 was promulgated […], Ms. J., her family members or defense counsel could have filed an application for habeas corpus, because it was in force in domestic law […]; however, they did not do so, [and] this omission cannot be transferred to the State.” Peru indicated that “[t]he absence of an application for habeas corpus in her favor was not due, at that time, to the new counter-terrorism legislation.” It also indicated that an application for habeas corpus “is not filed two, three, four weeks or six months after the detention; it is filed immediately to counter an arbitrary detention.” A.5.2) Considerations of the Court 170. Article 7(6) of the Convention protects the right of every individual deprived of liberty to appeal the lawfulness of his detention before a competent judge or court, so that the latter may decide without delay on the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty and, if appropriate, order his or her release. 282 The Court has emphasized that the authority that must decide on the lawfulness of the arrest or detention must be a judge or court; the Convention is thereby safeguarding that the control of the deprivation of liberty must be judicial. 283 It has also stated that the remedies “must not only exist formally in law, but they must be effective; that is, they must meet the objective of obtaining a decision on the lawfulness of the arrest or of the detention promptly.” 284 171. The Court notes that as of the entry into force of Decree-Law 26,659 in August 1992, “actions of amparo for those detained, accused of, or prosecuted for the crime of terrorism [were declared inadmissible] under Decree-Law No. 25,475” (supra para. 72). This Court observes that the right to appeal the lawfulness of the detention before a judge must be guaranteed throughout the time that the person is deprived of liberty. Ms. J. was detained until June 18, 1993, so that for ten months and five days of her detention, she was unable to avail herself of the remedy of habeas corpus, if she had wished to do so, because the said legal provision contrary to the Convention was 285 the Court considers that, as of the entry into force of in force. Therefore, as it has in other cases, Decree-Law 26,659 the State violated Article 7(6) of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to the detriment of Ms. J. 172. Moreover, based on the foregoing conclusion, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the alleged violation of Article 7(6) of the Convention due to the alleged factual impossibility of exercising the said remedies before the promulgation of Decree-Law 26,659. B) Right to judicial guarantees 286 and the principle of legality 282 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights), supra, para. 33, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 140. 283 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 126, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 140. 284 Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 97, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 141. 285 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, supra, paras. 52, 54 and 55; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, paras. 182 to 188; Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, paras. 166 to 170, and Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, supra, paras. 114 and 115. 286 The relevant part of Article 8 of the Convention stipulates that: “1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature. 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: […] (b) prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him; (c) adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense; (d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel; […] (f) the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light on the facts; (g) the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty […]. 4. An accused person acquitted by a non-appealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause. 5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of justice.” 54