227. The Court emphasizes that, although the decision of the “faceless” Supreme Court did not constitute a conviction, it did impair the rights of Ms. J., insofar as it affected the final nature of the acquittal. If the acquittal delivered in favor of Ms. J., had not been declared null and void, currently there would be no criminal proceedings open against Ms. J. In addition, the Court considers that the exigency of an adequate reasoning in the said ruling was even greater, because it annulled an acquittal delivered owing to insufficient evidence based on a supposed inadequate assessment of the evidence (supra para. 225). 228. In addition, this Court considers that the Supreme Court failed to act in accordance with the principle of the presumption of innocence, by requiring the lower court “to establish the innocence or guilt of those accused.” The Court recalls that the principle of the presumption of innocence requires that no one be convicted unless there is complete evidence or evidence beyond any 340 The Higher Court of Lima decided to acquit Ms. J. because it did reasonable doubt of their guilt. not have sufficient evidence of her guilt. By not explaining how the evidence had been assessed inadequately, or the undue evaluation of the facts, the Supreme Court presumed that Ms. J. was guilty. 229. Based on the above considerations, this Court finds that the judgment of December 27, 1993, of the “faceless” Supreme Court of Justice failed to comply with the obligation to provide the reasoning for judicial decisions and infringed the presumption of Ms. J.’s innocence, in violation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. B.2 Alleged violations of due process in the first and second stages of the criminal proceedings against Ms. J. B.2.1) Right to the presumption of innocence i. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 230. The Commission argued that the complaint and charges against Ms. J. are substantiated “to a great extent” on documents obtained during the “illegal and arbitrary” home search that resulted in the arrest of Ms. J., “together with the DINCOTE police attestation”; all of which also constituted evidence “provided and assessed by ‘faceless’ judges.” The Commission considered that “this fact per se constitutes a violation of the right to a hearing “with due guarantees” and of the right to the presumption of innocence. The Commission also argued that several newspaper articles reveal “apparent quotes by different State officials” that “constitute indications of a prejudgment contrary to the presumption of innocence.” In addition, the Commission indicated that “the declaration of the nullity of a final judgment, without any reasoning, constitutes an additional violation of the right to the presumption of innocence”. 231. The representative argued that J. was presented together with her sister as a terrorist, in a press conference by the [then Minister of the Interior],” which constituted “a flagrant violation of the presumption of her innocence.” She indicated that “these images served to perpetuate the false image of [J.] as a terrorist, which the Peruvian State has been disseminating for 20 years, without fail.” The representative also argued that “senior State agents have insistently indicated that […], in their opinion, [J.] is not a presumed terrorist; she is a terrorist,” and have attacked J. publicly. She indicated that “both the newspaper articles presented […] before the Inter-American Commission” and statements made by high-ranking authorities in 2012 reveal that the “name [of the presumed victim] and that of her family have been stigmatized.” The representative asserted 340 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 120, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 183. 68