20 Commission indicated that “the different scope and content of the decrees [is clear], for which reason one cannot make an argument based solely on the interpretive character of the latter two.” 71. The representative added that Decree Law No. 25876 “constituted an express act of retaliation in response to the [c]ourt [a]ction of [a]mparo requested by the [f]unctionaries,” given that, according to the representative, the company “drafted” the decree and “got it issued by the government [...of] former President Fujimori.” The representative alleged that the judgment of the Supreme Court that “rules the retroactive application of Law Decree no. 25876 constitutional” constitutes “fraudulent res judicata” as it “acts against express constitutional guarantees” and “the judges signing it were acting neither independently nor impartially.” Based on this, the representative pointed to the political context in Peru during that time, indicating that the judgment “was issued by [a] false [j]udicial [p]ower, established outside constitutional rule that could not raise the flags of independence and impartiality, that was not only harshly questioned for the arbitrariness and unconstitutionality of its rulings, but also for its obvious subjugation to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch of the dictatorship in power at that time.” The representative added that the judgment “was issued in the context of a dictatorship [...] where it was not possible for the workers to obtain a judgment in their favor and against the State.” 72. For its part, the State indicated that the legislative decree and the subsequent regulations it contained were valid legal regulations that have been ratified by the domestic juridical system. They were applied to all State business activity and not designed specifically for the SEDAPAL workers, nor for those later affiliated with the SIFUSE union.” The State added that “the judgment of the Supreme Court [was] handed down as part of a labor proceeding, [which] resulted in a ruling on the merits [...] that for Peru has the status of res judicata[. Since it was] handed down within a proceeding whose validity has not been questioned,” “it has the status of res judicata on labor issues. Even then had it been fraudulent res judicata, the statute of limitations for contesting the ruling of the highest body in Peruvian jurisdiction would have expired.” The State also argued “that it is false that during the rule of former President Alberto Fujimori (1995 - 2000) the Judicial Branch and/or the Constitutional Tribunal had denied access to proper and effective [j]udicial [p]rotection - that is, had failed to apply Peruvian law justly and with respect for the procedural guarantees of the plaintiffs. In this sense, [it is] demonstrated that although there were judgments in favor of the Peruvian State, there were also rulings in favor of workers, especially at the level of the Constitutional Tribunal.” 73. The Tribunal observes that the Peruvian Political Constitution in force at the time of the facts established the guarantee of non-retroactivity of laws. Specifically, Article 187 established among its provisions that, “[n]o law has retroactive force or effect except in criminal, labor or tax issues when it is beneficial to the prisoner, worker or tax payer, respectively.”61 The case law of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitional Tribunal of Peru has indicated that the principle of non-retroactivity implies that “a Law may not be applied to facts or situations that took place before its promulgation and publication.”62 61 It should be noted that the 1979 Peruvian Constitution was changed in 1993. In the new Constitution, Article 103 establishes that, “No law has retroactive force or effect except in criminal law when it is beneficial to the prisoner.” 62 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Peru, Chamber of constitutional and social law, December 12, 2002, (case file on the Merits, tome III, annex 4, folio 1205). Also see Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Peru, Chamber of constitutional and social law, March 18, 2010, (case file on the Merits, tome III, annex 2, folio 1196). However, that case law establishes two exceptions to this rule, to wit: i) when so-called “benign” retroactivity is applied, which by virtue of Article 187 means that the regulation can have retroactive effects in labor or criminal law if they are beneficial, which is to say it “provides for the application of the principle of retroactivity of laws in labor issues when the law to be applied has beneficial effects.” Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Peru, Chamber of