liberty […],” as the resources intended to meet their medical needs are insufficient to guarantee their right to physical integrity and life. 31. First, the Court considers it appropriate to specify that the alleged current state of access to health of those deprived of liberty in Ecuadorian prisons does not form part of the factual basis presented by the Commission in its application. Indeed, this case concerns, inter alia, the medical care received by Mr. Vera Vera while under State custody approximately eighteen years ago, in light of an alleged situation of a general nature in Ecuador at that time. Therefore, the allegation made by the Commission in its final written arguments (supra para. 9) was not presented at the opportune procedural moment, and as such, it will not be considered by this Tribunal. 32. On the other hand, it is reiterated jurisprudence of the Court that alleged victims and their representatives can invoke the violation of rights other than those included in the application, inasmuch as they are holders of the rights enshrined in the Convention, and provided those allegations address facts contained in the application. In effect, the application constitutes the factual framework for the proceedings before the Court, and thus it is not acceptable to allege facts distinct from those in the application, without detriment to those facts that explain, clarify, or refute those that have been mentioned in the application, or those that answer any of the plaintiff’s claims.19 The exception to this principle are those facts characterized as supervening, which may be submitted before the Court at any procedural stage prior to the issuance of the judgment.20 On the other hand, the time for the alleged victims or their representatives to fully exercise the right to locus standi in judicio is in the brief of pleadings and motions.21 In short, the Court must decide, in each case, whether arguments of such nature will be admitted, safeguarding the equality of arms of the parties.22 33. As such, the Court notes that the arguments of the representative refer to the alleged current prison conditions in Ecuador, based on alleged facts that took place during this year and on the expert report of social worker Beatriz Villarreal Tobar, who describes the alleged prison situation of Ecuador as of today. As noted, these facts do not form part of the factual 19 Cf. Case of “Five Pensioners” V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, paras. 153 and 155; Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá, supra note 3, para. 43, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores V. México, supra note 7, para. 56. 20 Cf. Case of “Five Pensioners” V. Perú, supra note 19, para. 154; Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá, supra note 3, para. 43, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores V. México, supra note 7, para. 56. 21 Cf. Case of tje “Mapiripan Massacre” V. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 56; Case of González et al. (“Cotton Fields”) V. México. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 232, and Case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. V. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, para. 237. 22 Cf. Case of de la “Mapiripan Massacre” V. Colombia, supra note 21, para. 58; Case of The Dos Erres Massacre V. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 4, 2009. Series C No. 211, para. 165, and Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá, supra note 3, para. 43. 14