- 21 authority and usurpation of functions] against the [Public Administration and the State of Honduras].85 63. On July 20, 2009, it issued a third communiqué in which it also indicated that “its actions had been taken and will continue to be taken within the framework of the Constitution and the law.”86 On July 31, and August 21 that year, it issued two more press communiqués ratifying the preceding information.87 In the second of these communiqués, it defined what had happened as a “constitutional succession.”88 64. None of these press communiqués mentioned the forcible transfer of President Zelaya out of the country. According to different newspaper articles, Roberto Micheletti had met with the full Supreme Court during this time.89 65. Regarding all these actions by the Supreme Court, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that the Supreme Court “was unable to transcend the crisis, abandoned its role of arbitrator, and became a protagonist in the process of removing José Manuel Zelaya from the office of constitutional President of the Republic.”90 Similarly, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, stated that “the Supreme Court had participated in the dissolution of the constitutional order by deviating from the rules of independence and impartiality by which it should be characterized.”91 Also, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that these actions by the Supreme Court “cast doubt on its impartiality and commitment to the rule of law.”92 66. With regard to other judicial authorities, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission asserted that, in the case of the “prosecutor general […] a similar situation occurs to that of the Supreme Court of Justice, because he was involved from the start of the 2009 institutional crisis and acted in a way that favored the government de facto.” In this regard, it stated that “the Prosecutor General and the Special Prosecutor for the Defense of the Constitution abstained from contesting the 85 Communiqué of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 30, 2009 (evidence file, folio 15). 86 Communiqué of the Supreme Court of Justice of July 20, 2009 (evidence file, folio 22). 87 Cf. Communiqué of the Supreme Court of Justice of August 21, 2009 (evidence file, folios 27 to 31). 88 Cf. Communiqué of the Supreme Court of Justice of August 21, 2009 (evidence file, folio 30). 89 Cf. Newspaper articles entitled: “Micheletti consulta a la Corte opinión sobre polémico decreto” and “Micheletti y magistrados discuten decreto” which appear in the file of the action on constitutionality filed by Adán Guillermo López Lone (evidence file, folios 425 and 427). 90 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR). Para que los hechos no se repitan: Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, July 2011, p. 402 (evidence file, folio 7674). In this regard, the International Commission of Jurists indicated that these communiqués revealed a “broad and unconditional support for the Army’s actions [and] sent a clear message that the Supreme Court of Justice would not oppose the coup d’état.” International Commission of Jurists, La independencia del Poder Judicial en Honduras (2004-2013), pp. 30 Similarly, see, Human Rights Watch, After the Coup: Ongoing Violence, Intimidation, and Impunity in Honduras, December 2010, p. 39. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/honduras1210webwcover_0.pdf 91 Press communiqué on statement made by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. Available at: http://www.cinu.mx/noticias/la/honduras-relator-especial-urge/. See also, Expert opinion of Leandro Despouy provided during the public hearing held in this case. 92 United Nations, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the violations of human rights in Honduras since the coup d’état on 28 June 2009. Doc. UN A/HRC/13/66, March 3, 2010, para. 73 (merits file, folio 1293).