- 52 expression,293 and the right of assembly;294 it will then examine the alleged violation of the right to freedom of association295 and the alleged indirect violation of freedom of expression. A. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 157. The Commission pointed out that the presumed victims were subject to disciplinary administrative proceedings because they revealed their opposition to the coup d’état. In this regard, it indicated that “ownership of the right to freedom of expression cannot be confined to a specific profession or group of persons, or to the realm of freedom of the press,” and that judges, as public officials, also enjoy this right. However, “the exercise of [their] freedom of expression […] has specific connotations and distinctive characteristics.” In this regard, it asserted that judicial officials “have a special duty to maintain discretion and exercise prudence […] to safeguard the principles of independence and impartiality.” It also emphasized that the exercise of freedom of expression “has become the main means by which illegal or abusive acts […] of state authorities are exposed,” and that, in conditions characterized by an institutional and democratic crisis, “social protest […] can become the only available tool for effective and inclusive citizen participation.” In this regard, it underscored that opinions relating to a coup d’état are of great public interest and have the highest level of protection under the American Convention. From this perspective, it stated that the “legitimate protection of the principles of judicial independence and impartiality cannot be premised on the notion that a judge must remain silent on public issues; [r]ather any restrictions must strike a proper balance between the right of judges to express their opinions and their duty to exercise the discretion and prudence necessary to protect the independence and autonomy of their office.” The Commission also considered that “the legal framework of disciplinary proceedings in Honduras was characterized by its breadth and ambiguity […] and it was difficult to determine, with the certainty that strict legality demands, what type of conduct was prohibited in relation to the right to freedom of expression and participation of judges.” 158. The representatives argued that the fact that the presumed victims in this case were judges “did not in any way deprive them of their rights to freedom of expression and assembly” and the exercise of such rights could only have been restricted in order to uphold the dignity, impartiality and independence that should characterize the exercise of their functions. They also indicated that, “no right inherent to the judicial function were harmed in any of the cases in which the victims exercised those rights.” In addition, they stressed that, in their capacity as public officials, “they had a special duty of loyalty to the democratically elected government that was deposed by means of the coup d’état.” Furthermore, they underlined that, when emitting their opinion, the presumed victims “merely […] defended the country’s democratic institutional framework,” and they did this in their capacity as citizens and human rights defenders. The representatives affirmed that the dismissals constituted interference in the exercise of freedom of expression and, in the case of Guillermo López Lone, also of the right to freedom of assembly. They also argued that “the norms applied in order to dismiss the victims [could] not be considered laws in the formal sense, because they were not legal norms adopted by a legislative organ and promulgated by the Executive Branch, pursuant to the procedure required by the domestic law of each State.” In this regard, they explained that “some of the norms that established the punishable conducts and their sanctions 293 Article 13(1) of the Convention stipulates that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice.” 294 Article 15 of the Convention establishes that: “The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of others.” 295 Article 16(1) of the Convention establishes that: “Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.”