- 66 202. Without prejudice to the findings in Chapter VII-1 supra, a series of irregularities existed in
the disciplinary proceedings against the presumed victims that the Court will now examine.
B. Guarantees of the competence, independence and impartiality of the disciplinary
authorities in cases involving judges
B.1) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties
203. The Commission concluded that the State had “violated the right to a hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial authority established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention in
relation to the obligations established in Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of
Guillermo López Lone, Ramón Barrios [Maldonado], Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha and Tirza Flores
Lanza.” Regarding the competence of the disciplinary authorities, it pointed out that the action of
the Judicial Service Council as an appeal court was “contrary to the provisions of article 313 of the
Constitution, according to which, first, the Judicial Service Council should recommend the dismissal
to the Supreme Court of Justice and, then, it is the Supreme Court that takes the respective
decision.” Regarding the principle of judicial independence, the Commission indicated that “the
action of the Judicial Service Council was incompatible with the guarantee of independence.” It also
noted that, after the Council’s members had disqualified themselves, “neither the case file nor the
applicable norms clarify the criteria used by the President of the Council to select and appoint the
members of the Council for the specific case and whether the criteria were made public.” The
Commission also considered that it had insufficient evidence to rule on the alleged lack of
independence of the Supreme Court. With regard to impartiality, it argued that the Supreme Court
“did not meet the objective elements of impartiality to hear the presumed victims […], given that
their interests were evidently contrary to those of the Court” as regards the coup d’état; added to
the fact that “the presumed victims were unable to challenge the lack of impartiality of the
members of the [Supreme Court of Justice].” In addition, it indicated that “the Supreme Court is
the judicial organ that makes a final ruling on appeals contesting the decisions taken by judges,
[but also,] it has the disciplinary authority to sanction judges of lower courts.” The Commission
added that “[t]his lack of impartiality also permeated all the authorities who ruled on the
responsibility of the [presumed] victims, in view of their relationship of dependence vis-à-vis the
Supreme Court.”
204. The representatives argued that “the disciplinary authorities who decided the dismissal of the
[presumed] victims did not meet the requirements of competence, independence and impartiality.”
They underlined that there are three disciplinary regimes in Honduras: a constitutional regime, a
legal regime and “a third regime [applied to the presumed victims] that was not established in
either the Constitution or by law.” They asserted that, owing to these normative contradictions, the
presumed victims were in a situation of “absolute legal uncertainty,” which restricted their right of
defense, “because they could not be certain about which organ would hear their proceedings.” In
this regard, they argued that “the authority that finally decided their dismissal – namely, the
plenum of the [Supreme Court of Justice], was not the authority that obtained and assessed the
evidence presented during the proceedings, and failed to give a hearing to the persons who were
subject to the disciplinary proceedings”; and even though the latter had alleged violations of due
process in their appeals, ��the [Judicial Service Council] declared all the appeals inadmissible without
ruling on their merits.”
205. The representatives also asserted that the concentration of judicial and administrative powers
in the Supreme Court of Justice had impaired judicial independence. Furthermore, they indicated
that the Judicial Service Council could not be considered independent for three reasons: (1) the
irregularities and defects in the process of appointing council members; (2) that there was no legal
provision concerning the appointment of substitute members, and “there is no information on the
criteria and procedure used by the President of the Council to appoint substitute members to