- 69 211. At the domestic level, during the rebuttal hearings before the Personnel Management Directorate, the presumed victims indicated that “[t]here is an absolute lack of precision as to who is the ordinary judge in the disciplinary proceedings against judicial officials and employees.”368 Furthermore, in the hearings on the appeal filed before the Judicial Service Council, they pointed out that “[t]he Council does not have powers to hear appeals against the rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice, because the law only grants them powers to hear appeals against the decisions of the Personnel Directorate [and t]he procedure that concluded with the dismissals was illegitimate and contrary to the law.”369 212. Nevertheless, the bodies that intervened in the disciplinary proceedings against the presumed victims did not respond to these arguments duly and sufficiently (notwithstanding the response of the Judicial Service Council with regard to its competence to decide appeals against rulings of the Supreme Court which will be examined below, para. 220). Even though it could be understood that, based on the principle of the primacy of the Constitution, the procedures established in that instrument should have been applied, as verified previously, such procedures were not followed (supra paras. 208 and 209). Indeed, the procedure applied was the result of a practice that was not reflected in either a law or a judicial decision or in any other document, law or norm of a public of general nature that would have guaranteed the requirements of due process to the presumed victims in the determination of disciplinary sanctions against them. 213. Furthermore, Article 2 of the Convention obliges States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of the Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms protected by the Convention.370 This obligation entails the adoption of two types of measures. On the one hand, the elimination of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention,371 either because they ignore those rights and freedoms or they procedures that were being applied to us,” and also, “[w]hen the case was in the hands of the Judicial Service Council, [he] was unaware of the procedure to follow, because the Judicial Service Act was fairly ambiguous and imprecise as regards the procedure, and [they] were not given sufficient information.” Affidavit made by Luis Alfonso Chévez de la Rocha on January 8, 2015 (evidence file, folios 6643 and 6644). Justice Flores Lanza also stated that: “[a]t the time, the regulatory framework of the disciplinary procedure contained many defects and omissions and that, together with the arbitrary and authoritarian attitude of some of the judicial employees who were in charge of it, resulted in the proceedings being plagued by numerous violations of due process.” Affidavit made by Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza on January 7, 2015 (evidence file, folio 6665). 368 They also asserted that: “This ‘diffuse ordinary judge’ limits or prevents the defendants from alleging grounds for recusal. Moreover, the administrative official is in a situation of administrative subordination in relation to his superior, and in frank dependence, which does not allow him to form his opinions independently. But, the most serious factor is that, subsequently, the body that will impose the sanction – the President or the plenum of justices of the Supreme Court of Justice – has already prejudged the facts owing to his direct or indirect participation in the investigation. In these conditions, it is difficult to be able to conceive the existence of the mechanism of the ordinary judge and his independent function.” Statements made by Guillermo López Lone and Luis Chévez de la Rocha before the Personnel Management Directorate at the rebuttal hearing of the disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Barrios Maldonado and Mrs. Flores Lanza on December 3 and 7, 2009 (evidence file, folios 305, 1456, 1948 and 2464). 369 Hearings before the Judicial Service Council on September 29, 2010, and on February 24, 2011, in the disciplinary proceedings against Adán Guillermo López Lone and Ramón Barrios Maldonado (evidence file, folios 534, 3163 and 3164). 370 Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Preliminary objections. Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 12, para. 50 and Case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 389. 371 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 207, and Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 270.