- 74 judicial system is perverted. Recusal should not necessarily be seen as a judgment on the moral rectitude of the official recused, but rather as a tool that inspires confidence in those who have recourse to the State requiring the intervention of organs that must be, and seem to be, impartial.389 225. Thus, recusal is a procedural instrument designed to protect the right to be tried by an impartial organ and does not constitute or define that right. In other words, a judge who cannot be recused is not necessarily biased – or will act in a biased manner; in the same way that a judge who can be recused is not necessarily impartial – or will act in an impartial manner.390 226. In this case, the State has argued that impartiality was ensured in the disciplinary proceedings, because those permanent or substitute members of the Council who could have jeopardized this impartiality disqualified themselves, and substitute members were appointed to replace them (supra para. 99). Nevertheless, the Court considers that, even when domestic law allows this, such disqualifications are not sufficient to ensure the impartiality of the prosecuting body, because it is necessary to prove that the defendant is able to question the suitability and competence of a judge who, although he should have disqualified himself, did not do so. 227. In its decision, the Judicial Service Council indicated that the substitute members of the Council appointed by its President were “officials who had not intervened in any of the decisions issued by the Supreme Court of Justice in its rulings against the appellants, in order to ensure […] impartiality and objectivity in the case submitted to its consideration.” It also asserted that they were “officials who had entered the Judiciary and been appointed to their functions through a competitive procedure and who had enjoyed a long and unblemished career within it,”391 so that their independence cannot be questioned (supra para. 99, 118, 134 and 146). In response to a request for useful information from the President of this Court, the State affirmed that all the members of the Judicial Service Council that decided the cases of the presumed victims “were judges or justices performing their judicial functions in the context of their professional career.”392 However, the representatives indicated that the Council “was not composed solely of individuals who were judges or justices.” In this regard, they provided probative documentation according to which at least one of the individuals who ultimately composed the Judicial Service Council in the proceedings against all the presumed victims was not a judge but rather an expert attached to the Supreme Court.393 389 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 64, and Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, members and activity of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 29, 2014. Series C No. 279, para. 30. 390 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 64. 391 Decisions of the Judicial Service Council of August 24, 2011, with regard to Adán Guillermo López Lone, Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha, Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza and Ramón Enrique Barrios Maldonado (evidence file, folios 1011, 1068, 2227, 2269, 2829, 3508, 3509, 3537, 3561 and 3584). 392 393 Brief of the State received on August 7, 2015 (merits file, folio 1886). Specifically, the representatives indicated that Silvia Trinidad Santos Moncada, who was a member of the Judicial Service Council that decided the appeals of the four presumed victims in this case was employed as a “Level II expert of the Supreme Court of Justice,” as recorded in a contract for professional services provided to the case file. According to the representatives, the text establishes that the contract is for an employment relationship under the terms of “excluded service” [servicio excluido], which means that the Supreme Court was ‘free to appoint, hire and remove her, and terminate or rescind her contract.” Cf. Brief of the representatives of August 21, 2015 (merits file, folio 1927); decisions of the Judicial Service Council of August 24, 2011, with regard to Adán Guillermo López Lone, Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha, Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza and Ramón Enrique Barrios Maldonado (evidence file, folios 1080, 2241, 2843 and 3520), and Professional services contract signed by the President of the Supreme Court, on behalf of the Court, and Silvia Trinidad Santos Moncada on April 1, 2011 (evidence file, folios 7283 and 7284).