21 relation to the absence of an effective judicial remedy to enforce the right to consular assistance,108 and regarding the lack of due diligence in the investigations,109 respectively. 68. While the jurisprudence is consistent up to this point, and the difference between the remedies that are provided for both in Article 8(2)(h), as well as Article 25 of the American Convention, seem, at least, prima facie evident, there exists, undoubtedly, a gray area where these distinctions may not be as easy to realize, especially when you take into account the broad range of expectations that the recourse framed in Article 25 of the Convention can have, in comparison with the diverse claims that can be substantiated in domestic jurisdictions. III. THE INTEGRATIVE DIMENSION OF THE RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE 25 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION A. The right to judicial protection as an integrative instrument of fundamental rights from both domestic sources and the Convention 69. Article 25(1) (judicial protection) of the American Convention states that “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.” 70. From its earliest jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court identified that the American Convention establishes the obligation that all State Parties undertake to “respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms” (Article 1(1)). From this general obligation comes the right provided for in Article 25(1) of every person “to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention.”110 Moreover, in addition to the formal existence of remedies, such effectiveness supposes that these provide results or responses to the violations of rights provided for in either the Convention, Constitution, or legislation. 71. Despite being cited by the Inter-American Court on multiple occasions, as is the case in the present Judgment,111 these criteria have not been sufficiently developed with respect to all of their implications, especially in regard to the fact that this recourse must protect the people against acts that violate their rights recognized not only by domestic legislation, but by the American Convention as well. Taking the provisions of Article 25 seriously would lead us to establish the obligation that effective judicial remedies be provided, and that these remedies monitor compliance not only with the laws, but also with the Constitution of 108 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 3, 2010. Series C No. 218, para. 254. 109 Cf. Case of Mendoza et al. V. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits and Reparations. Judgment of May 14, 2013. Series C No. 260, para. 227. 110 Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency(arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series to No. 9, para. 22. 111 Para. 116 of the Judgment.