36 8(2)(h), which was flagrantly violated. In this regard, it is important to note that, on occasion, the Inter-American Court has ordered that control for conformity with the Convention be exercised to remedy these situations. Surely, the law should have facilitated the operation of the High Court of Justice or, if applicable, created the Constitutional Court and given it jurisdiction to resolve matters of this sort. Therefore, the turning to an instance to claim the unconstitutionality and non-conformity with the Convention of the absence of a specific recourse should have translated into some response on the part of the judiciary, in this case, perhaps by the High Court of Justice. However, the same omissions in the full implementation of the model of constitutional control compromised the ability of the High Court to do more and, without doubt, left Mr. Alibux in a situation of defenselessness, thereby violating his right to judicial protection embodied in Article 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) and 2 of such international instrument, in such a way that, in the case at hand, the Inter-American System had to act in the alternative. 121. Second, viewing the right to judicial protection as a means of integrating the rights would have shed a different light on the claims of Mr. Alibux in a model of exercising control for conformity with the Convention. 122. As it has already been mentioned, Article 25(1) (judicial protection) of the American Convention provides that “Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse […] for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention […].” 123. In this case, Mr. Alibux argued before the High Court of Justice of his country that Article 140 of the Constitution and the Indictment of Political Office Holders Act were inconsistent with Article 14(5) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention for creating a process in a sole instance before such High Court of Justice;175 that is, he presented in a precise manner an argument of nonconformity with the Convention of the Constitution itself and the law that was applied. The response of the High Court of Justice was to mention that “despite having binding effects on the State, the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights had no direct legal effect, since a domestic court could not establish processes of appeal that are not recognized by the law, and therefore, had to abide by the terms set forth in Article 140 of the Constitution.”176 As can be appreciated, the response of the High Court of Justice did not properly study the problem of conformity with the Convention raised, rather it simply limited itself to express the reasons why domestic courts were not able to establish processes not regulated by law, so that they had to apply the constitutional article, whose lack of conformity with the Convention was precisely challenged by the now victim, consequently subtracting any useful effect of the treaty provisions. 124. In my opinion, through the substantive right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25 of the American Convention, the legislation should provide for, and the judges effectuate, a recourse that takes into account the monitoring and controlling of compliance with the laws, the Constitution, and the treaties, this in terms of the Convention itself. This case illustrates that for a judicial remedy to be effective, in light of Article 25 of the already mentioned treaty, it must consider that the same right can have its basis both in domestic sources and diverse international sources, in this case, the American Convention, as well as even other international instruments. 175 Cf. Para. 117 of the Judgment. 176 Para. 118 of the Judgment.