having been brought before a competent authority, who, as appropriate, would determine their release, which resulted in the violation of Article 7(5) of the American Convention to the detriment of the detained victims. 140. Article 7(6) protects the right of all persons deprived of liberty to have recourse to a competent court, in order that the latter may decide, without delay, on the lawfulness of the detention, and as appropriate, order their release.203 In this regard the Court has emphasized that the “authority that must decide the legality of the arrest or detention must be a judge or court. Thus, the Convention is ensuring that it must be the judicial system that controls the detention.”204 141. Regarding the nature of such remedies, the Court’s case law has indicated that they “must not only exist formally in law, but must be effective; in other words, they must comply with the objective of obtaining, without delay, a decision on the lawfulness of the arrest or detention.”205 142. Thus, the Dominican Constitution in force at the time of the facts (supra para. 127), stipulated that:206 g. Anyone who has custody of a detainee shall be obliged to present him or her as soon as the competent authority requires. The Habeas Corpus Act shall determine how to proceed summarily in order to comply with the requirements contained in subparagraphs (a), (b ), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) and shall establish the appropriate sanctions. 143. In addition, Court observes that the migratory regulations in force at the time of the incident (supra paras. 128 and 129) did not establish remedies to contest the lawfulness of the arrest or detention, as established in Article 7(6) of the Convention, but only established the possibility for the detainee to “refute the charges” on which his or her deportation was based or to be “heard regarding the charges indicated in the arrest warrant” or “to provide evidence opposing the deportation.” In this regard, the Court has indicated that the right protected by Article 7(6) of the Convention “signifies that the detainee may truly exercise this right, assuming that he or she is able to do so, and that the State really provide this remedy and decides it.”207 However, the Court finds that, owing to their rapid expulsion, the migrant victims had no opportunity to exercise an appropriate remedy that would control the lawfulness of the detention. Consequently, the State violated Article 7(6) of the Convention to the detriment of the detained victims. 144. Based on the above arguments, the Court considers that the detention of the seven Haitian migrants did not comply with the constitutional and legislative provisions in force at the time of the events, because the detention was not intended to conduct a proceeding capable of determining the circumstances and legal status of those detained, or even to carry out a formal migratory procedure in order to deport or expel them; because of the absence of oral or written information about the reasons or grounds for the detentions and written notification of the charges against victims. The foregoing signified that the State violated the right to personal liberty established in Article 7(1), 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4), 7(5) 203 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 33; Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 124, and Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 158. 204 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. para.126. 205 Cf. Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No. 129, para. 97 and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 129. 206 Constitution of the Dominican Republic, 1994, supra, folio 4109. 207 Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 114, and Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 158. 42