said person may have effective access to justice on equal terms.”226 Preventing the person subjected to an administrative proceeding that involves a sanction from having legal counsel is severely limiting his or her right to defense, which causes procedural imbalance and leaves the individual unprotected before the exercise of the sanctioning powers.227 Therefore, in cases where the consequence of the immigration proceeding may be a punitive deprivation of liberty – as the expulsion was in this case – “free legal representation becomes an imperative for the interests of justice.”228 165. In addition, the Court has held, in relation to access to consular assistance, that in cases of migrants who are faced with a deprivation of liberty proceeding, it should be stressed that: Aliens detained in a social and juridical milieu different from their own, and often in a language they do not know, experience a condition of particular vulnerability, which the right to information on consular assistance, inserted into the conceptual universe of human rights, seeks to remedy in such a way that the detained alien may enjoy a true opportunity for justice, and the benefit of the due process of law equal to those who do not have those disadvantages, carried out with respect for the dignity of the person.229 166. Thus, in order to guarantee the right to due process of an alien who has been detained, the Court has indicated that at least three elements of this guarantee must be ensured: (i) the right to be informed of his or her rights under the Vienna Convention, which must be implemented together with the State’s obligations under Article 7(4) of the Convention;230 (ii) the right to have access to communication with a consular official, and (iii) the right to the assistance itself.231 167. In addition, the Court recalls that the immigration laws in force in the Dominican Republic at the time of the events (supra paras. 128 and 129) stipulated that “[n]o alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific charges that underlie their deportation and without having been given a fair opportunity to refute these charges,”232 and that, when there are “credible reports” that an alien is in the country in violation of the Immigration Act, the Immigration Inspector “shall request […] an arrest warrant [which] must state the facts and describe the specific reasons why the alien is subject to deportation. If the arrest warrant is issued, the Immigration Inspector shall summon the alien to be heard on the charges stated in the arrest warrant.” Also, “[i]f none of the charges indicated in the warrant is admitted by the alien, evidence shall be sought to substantiate the charges, the alien shall be summoned again and given another opportunity to declare and to introduce evidence opposing the deportation.”233 In addition, the Court finds that the instrument that regulated the repatriation procedures for Haitian migrants at the time of the 226 Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 132. See also, mutatis mutandi, Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, paras. 51 and 63, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 184. 227 Cf. Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, paras. 61 and 62, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 155. 228 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 146. 229 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 152. See also, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, supra, para. 119, and Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, supra, para. 121. 230 Cf. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Article 36.1.b) UN Doc A/CONF.25/12 of 24 April 1963, in force as of 19 March 1967. This notification must be made before the first statement is made. See also, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, supra, para. 106; Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez, supra, para. 164, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 153. 231 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor, supra, para. 153. 232 Immigration Act, Law 95 of April 14, 1939, supra, folio 4240 233 Migration Regulations No. 279 of May 12, de 1939, supra, folio 4340. 47