7. In this specific case, the Court considered that the fact that neither the law nor jurisprudence permitted filing a request for review of the impartiality of the disciplinary judge was a violation of the right to be tried by an impartial court.5 The Court specified that a challenge grants the parties the right to move for a judge to be set aside when, irrespective of the personal conduct of the judge challenged, there are facts that can be proved or elements of conviction that raise well-founded doubts or legitimate concerns about his impartiality, thus signifying that his decision is seen as being motivated by reasons other than the law and, consequently, the functioning of the judicial system is distorted.6 Even though the members of the disciplinary body could have disqualified themselves, the Court considered this insufficient, owing to the impossibility of the justiciable having any remedy to challenge the judge who, although he should have disqualified himself, did not do so.7 8. Also, when deciding the factual dispute with regard to judicial independence, the Court noted “the existence of an intimidating conduct towards the judges of the First Court.” When determining the legal consequences of the foregoing, the Court indicated that “public officials, especially the most senior Government authorities, must be particularly careful to ensure that their public declarations do not constitute a form of interference with or pressure on judicial independence, or could induce or invite actions by other authorities that violate the judge’s independence or affect his or her liberty.”8 9. In addition, the violation of the American Convention arising from the problems relating to judicial independence in this case was as follows: since the members of the CFRSJ did not have a clearly-defined stability, because they could be removed without any previously established procedures and at the sole discretion of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Court concluded that due guarantees did not exist to ensure that the pressure exerted on the First Court would not influence the decisions of the disciplinary body. Based on the foregoing, the Court declared that the State had violated the right of the victims to be tried by a court with sufficient guarantees of independence.9 10. Furthermore, regarding the “obligation to state the reasons,” the Court noted that the removal was based on the arguments of the reviewing body, without an analysis being made of the inexcusable miscarriage of justice as a disciplinary offense; this required, first, providing the reasoning relating to the suitability of the victims to exercise their functions.10 Second, no reasoning was provided on the serious nature of the offense supposedly committed and on the proportionality of the punishment adopted.11 Third, the Court indicated that “the obligation to state the reasons does not require a detailed response to every argument made by the parties, but may vary according to the nature of the decision and, in each case, an analysis must be made of whether this guarantee has been observed.”12 Consequently, it found that the disciplinary body should have responded 5 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, paras. 63 to 67. 6 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 63. 7 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 65. 8 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 131. 9 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, paras. 147 and 148. 10 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, paras. 87 and 88. 11 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 89. 12 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, para. 90. 4