63 27, 2001, the INA approved the granting of a final title deed of full ownership over three plots of land covering 234 hectares that refer to one of the requests, and there is no evidence of a ruling being issued regarding the second request, and f) on January 22, 2001, the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its members requested the extension of the title deed of full ownership that had been granted in the year 1993. The Court has not been provided evidence that the INA issued a ruling on this request (supra para. 71). 234. Regarding the aforementioned, the Court recalls it does not have competence to hear of the recourses filed prior to September 9, 1981, date on which the State of Honduras acknowledged the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. 235. On the other hand, the Court verifies that three of the requests filed by the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz did not receive any answer whatsoever from the State. Therefore, this Court considers that the State is responsible for the violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of that same instrument, for the requests that did not receive any answer whatsoever from the INA, namely: those filed on June 27, 1969, July 8, 1998, and January 22, 2001. 236. All the other requests received a response in maximum periods of four years, which in this Court’s opinion is reasonable, taking into consideration the complexity of the matters they dealt with. 237. Regarding the request filed on August 28, 1997, it has been verified that it refers to an extension of 600 hectares and that the INA, in the year 2001, only granted an extension of full ownership over 234 hectares. The Commission and the representatives indicated that this land recognition procedure was not effective because the Community was not granted the totality of the land requested, but instead a smaller extension. The Court recalls that, in general terms, Article 8(1) of the American Convention includes “a material aspect of protection, which means that the State must guarantee that the decision produced by the proceedings satisfies the end for which it was conceived. The latter does not mean that the right must always be granted, but rather that the capacity of the body to produce the result for which it was conceived be guaranteed.”233 In that sense, it is not sufficient to argue that the domestic court did not approve all requirements included in a titling request to automatically conclude that there is a non-compliance with Article 8(1) of the Convention. 238. Without detriment of the aforementioned, in this case the Court recalls that in the chapter on merits regarding the right to communal property, it concluded that the State was responsible for not having titled plot A1 (infra Map Annex) that had been acknowledged as traditional territory by the INA (supra para. 115). In that sense, it is reasonable to consider that the decision of July 5, 2001 through which the INA rejected the request for domain over plot A1 (infra Map Annex) in favor of the Community of Triunfo de la Cruz did not take into consideration that the traditional nature of that territory implied acknowledging the Community’s right to property taking into account its own specificities and social characteristics. On this specific matter, the Court recalls that, “as regards indigenous and tribal peoples, it is essential for the States to grant effective protection that takes into account their specificities, their economic and social characteristics, as well as their situation of special vulnerability, their customary law, values, and customs.”234 Cfr. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 122, and Case of the Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí y the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and its Members v. Panama, para. 178. 233 Cfr. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, para. 63, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, para. 264. 234