time” and that, therefore, “it is not clear that members of Congress had a direct interest in the resolution, since the dismissal was prompted by […] a legal fact verified with the expiry of the judges’ term of office.” 2. Arguments regarding the nature of the decision to dismiss the judges 112. The Commission pointed out that “[r]esolutions of this kind, issued in the absence of a precise legal framework, foster doubts about the goals they pursue, and it is reasonable to consider the possibility that a kind of sanction was being imposed on the judicial officials in reprisal for the manner in which they exercised their judicial duties.” It added that “there are a number of elements or indications from which it is reasonable to infer that the dismissals were aimed at sanctioning the conduct or performance of the Supreme Court justices.” It argued that “the provision invoked by the National Congress [...] was not applicable” to the alleged victims. 113. For their part, the representatives argued that “[t]he process was punitive because during the session and the debate on December 8, Congress used arguments related to the exercise of public office by Ecuador’s highest court.” They argued that “[t]he provision applied by the National Congress sought to give the appearance of not being a punitive process, but rather the application of a provision that [was] not observed, equating the judges to other public or state official with a fixed term and designated by Congress”. They argued that “[t]he rule invoked by the National Congress to dismiss the [Supreme Court] justices was arbitrary and was not applicable to them.” 114. In its acknowledgment made at the public hearing in this case, the State accepted that the decision taken by Congress “could have been understood as an ad-hoc proceeding of a punitive nature.” Despite its acquiescence at the public hearing, in its final written arguments the State argued that “the judges appointed in 1997 were never covered by [Article 202 of the 1998 Constitution, since] their appointment preceded it and followed other political and juridical rules.” Likewise, the State argued that “the judges’ dismissal by the National Congress […] cannot be confused with an action of a punitive nature, which restricted the exercise of fundamental rights.” In this regard, it added that said decision “[i]nvolved implementing a provision that existed within the Ecuadorian legal system, which the alleged victims and the general public knew about, and which had to be observed without this implying the application of a sanction for those who held that position.” The State further argued that “the National Congress [was] authorized under Article 130, paragraph 4 of the 1998 Constitution [to] interpret the Constitution,” which it had done when analyzing the scope of Transitory Provision 25 and declaring the judges’ dismissal from office. Finally, in its final written arguments, the State emphasized that “in this case […] the discussion is over the application of a constitutional provision that is not of a disciplinary nature.” 3. Arguments regarding the right to be heard and right of defense 115. The Commission considered that “the resolution [on dismissal] was adopted by Congress on December 8, 2004, and there is no information whatsoever to indicate that the [alleged] victims were granted any possibility of defending themselves.” The Commission pointed out that the State itself acknowledged that “it was not necessary to notify the Supreme Court justices of the procedure or to grant the right of defense.” It added that in proceedings to remove judges from office it is necessary to apply “the guarantees of due process contemplated in Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 9 of the American Convention.” In its final written observations, the Commission emphasized that, as regards the right of defense, “[the judges´] participation in the process and the procedural opportunities to conduct their defense were nil, which wa[s] incompatible with Article 8(2) of the American Convention.” 37