State institutions. Likewise, the judges were prevented from filing an amparo remedy to challenge any decisions that Congress might take against them (infra para. 194). 176. From the events that took place and from the statements made by congressmen at the time, it is possible to reach several conclusions. First, it is clear that the reasons for which the transitory provision was not applicable to the Supreme Court justices were explained in detail by several congressmen. Second, although the motion to dismiss the judges did not come from the Presidency until the evening, is clear that most congressmen knew, from the outset of the discussion, of the intention to take that decision. In third place, the accusations of alleged acts of corruption or the alleged politicization of the judges were presented in a broad and generic manner. In fourth place, the Court notes that some congressmen mentioned that their dismissal was allegedly motivated by the intention to have the criminal proceedings against former President Bucaram closed, as indeed happened after the new Supreme Court took office (supra paras. 81 and 92). Finally, the Court emphasizes that although the agenda indicated that a discussion on the judiciary would take place (supra para. 74), the only decision taken in that regard was to dismiss the judges. 177. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the resolution by means of which the judges were dismissed was the result of a political alliance that was intended to create a Supreme Court sympathetic to the political majority existing at that time and to impede criminal proceedings against the acting president and a former president. The Court has confirmed that Congress’s resolution was not adopted by virtue of an exclusive assessment of specific factual evidence in order to ensure full compliance with the existing legislation, but that it pursued a completely different objective, related to an abuse of power. An example of this is that the summons to the session of Congress did not mention the imminent possibility of dismissing the judges (supra para. 74). Thus, the Court emphasizes that these elements support the affirmation that a mass and arbitrary dismissal of judges is unacceptable given its negative impact on judicial independence in its institutional aspect. 178. The Court considers that, in the circumstances of this case, the arbitrary dismissal of the entire Supreme Court constituted an attack on judicial independence, disrupted the democratic order and the Rule of Law and implied that there was no real separation of powers at that time. Furthermore, it implied the destabilization both of the judiciary and of the country in general (supra paras. 91, 94 and 97) which, amid a deepening political crisis, was left without a Supreme Court for seven months (supra para. 99), with the negative effects that this entailed for the protection of citizens’ rights. 179. The Court points out that under Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, “[e]ssential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the Rule of Law […] and the separation and independence of the branches of government.” The dismissal of all the members of the Supreme Court of Justice implied the destabilization of the democratic order existing in Ecuador at the time, because a rupture occurred in the separation and independence of the branches of government when an attack was made on Ecuador’s three high courts at that time. This Court emphasizes that the separation of powers is closely associated, not only with the consolidation of the democratic system, but also seeks to preserve the freedoms and human rights of citizens. 1.4. Conclusion on judicial guarantees and political rights 180. The Court concludes that in this case the Supreme Court justices were dismissed by means of a resolution of the National Congress, which lacked the proper jurisdiction to do so (supra para. 162), through the erroneous and arbitrary application of a legal provision 52