12. The important point to emphasize here is that the Inter-American Court has held that judicial independence constitutes an institutional guarantee in a democratic system that goes hand in hand with the principle of separation of powers, now enshrined in Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. In the instant case, it should also be borne in mind that the Supreme Court of Justice, of which the victims formed part in their capacity as judges, is itself a democratic institution called upon to uphold the rule of law. 13. It is also worth considering whether it is possible to configure a sort of right of defendants within the democratic conditions of public institutions, based not only on the aforementioned Article 3 of the Democratic Charter, but also on Article 29 of the American Convention; 15 this would be consistent with the international obligations of the States regarding the exercise of power according to the rule of law, the separation of powers and, of course, the independence of judges, as argued in other cases in which the Inter-American Court has clarified analogous issues. 16 A principle of this scope would go beyond the concept of democracy, in interpretative terms, as the Inter-American Court has stated inasmuch as “the just demands of democracy must […] guide the interpretation of the Convention and, in particular, the interpretation of those provisions that bear a critical relationship to the preservation and functioning of democratic institutions.” 17 14. In this initial context, which underscores the essentially democratic dimension of judicial independence, I consider it appropriate to examine and clarify certain primordial questions in this reasoned opinion: (i) the importance of context in this case (paras. 15-19); (ii) judicial independence in the Inter-American Court’s case law on the dismissal of judges (paras. 20-44); (iii) different concepts of judicial independence, particularly the institutional and personal independence of each judge (paras. 45-54); (iv) the institutional facet of judicial independence and its relationship to democracy (paras. 55-76), and (v) the lack of analysis of violations of other judicial guarantees and the principle of legality (paras. 7793). 15 “Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation No provision of this Convention may be interpreted as: a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” 16 Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 222. 17 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, para. 44. 4