exercise of judicial independence are: a) the presence of an authoritarian regime, b) the existence of cultural patterns that could undermine the usefulness of the courts as a mechanism for settling disputes, c) the commitment of civil society and politicians to judicial independence, and d) the judicial tradition, whether based on continental European or Common Law. 21 Indeed, it has been noted that, in Latin America in general, democracy continues to be weak and that strong executive powers have been a constant source of attacks on judicial independence. 22 III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TO THE REMOVAL OF JUDGES 20. In the case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, the Inter-American Court considered the resolution issued by Congress on May 28, 1997, in which some judges of Peru’s Constitutional Court were dismissed for alleged irregularities in the processing of a petition for clarification of a judgment that declared the non-applicability of Law No. 26,657. In this case, the Inter-American Court ruled that the guarantees of Article 8 of the American Convention provided for both in Part 1 and in Part 2, in addition to being applicable to criminal matters are applicable to matters of a civil, labor, fiscal or any other nature, and therefore due legal process is applicable. 23 21. The Court also pointed out that any public authority, whether administrative, legislative or judicial which, through its decisions, determines individual rights and obligations, has the obligation to observe the guarantees of due legal process. 24 Similarly, it specified that one of the main purposes of the separation of powers is to guarantee judicial independence and, to this end, different strict procedures have been devised for both the appointment and removal of judges. 25 The authority that carries out this procedure must behave impartially and allow judges to exercise their right of defense. 26 22. The Court also established that the independence of all judges presumes that there is an appropriate appointment process, a fixed term in the position and a guarantee against external pressures. 27 23. As regards the impeachment process in this case, in which the sanction of dismissal 28 was applied, the Court indicated that “any person subject to a proceeding of any nature in German Burgos S. (ed.), Independence Judicial in America Latina. ¿De quién? ¿Para qué? ¿Cómo? ILSA, Bogota, 1ª ed., 2003, pp. 121, 122. 21 MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, ibid. 22 Horan, Jennifer E. and Meinhold, Stephen S., “Separation of powers and the Ecuadorian Supreme Court: exploring presidential-judicial conflict in a post-transition democracy”, The Social Science Journal, 2012, vol. 29, pp. 232-234. 23 Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C, No. 71, para. 70. 24 Ibid. para. 71. 25 Ibid. para. 73. 26 Ibid. para. 74. 27 Ibid. para. 75. 28 Ibid. paras. 67 and 68. 6