on the Independence of the Judiciary, the criteria of the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe’s recommendations on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, as well as the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa. 55 IV. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL 45. There are different concepts of judicial independence which the Inter-American Court has developed in its doctrine and in its case law. Here, it is important to focus on the aspects related to its institutional and personal aspects. 46. According to Linares “we can analytically distinguish two aspects of judicial independence: one negative and another positive. The first involves the ability to avoid different sources of coercion and loyalties, while the second involves the application of the law—and all its sources— in deciding a specific case.” 56 47. For his part, Chaires distinguishes between objective-institutional independence and subjective-functional independence. 57 The first is associated with the absence of external pressures with respect to the judiciary. 58 The second concerns the mechanisms aimed at ensuring that a judge’s action is, as far as possible, consistent with the law. 59 48. Judicial independence has also been conceived as a value or as a guarantee. In its characterization as a value, its significance coincides with what is termed “functional independence” (also known as “substantive” or “decisional”). This concept of judicial independence translates into the basic rule of the system whereby a judge, in exercising his jurisdictional role, must be subject only to the law, i.e. to the current system of sources of law. On the other hand, in its characterization as a guarantee, judicial independence embodies a set of juridical mechanisms which seek to safeguard and fulfill the value mentioned, which is protected by other principles such as the separation of powers, the natural judge, impartiality, exclusivity, etc. 60 49. Within the concept of judicial independence as a guarantee, we can identify several facets. The first of these is the so-called “personal independence” which protects each judge as an individual and embodies the characteristics of his constitutional status, protecting him from possible pressures by the State’s political bodies —especially Parliament and the Executive Branch. Also, in more recent times, a guarantee of judicial independence in its “collective” and “internal” aspects has emerged. Collective judicial independence tends to protect the Judiciary as a whole against the other powers of the State, while the internal aspect protects the judge as an individual even from the rest of the judicial system. 61 55 Paragraphs 144 to 154 of the Judgment. 56 Linares, Sebastián, op. cit., p. 116. 57 Chaires Zaragoza, Jorge, op. cit., p. 531. 58 Ibid. p. 534. 59 Ibid. p. 536. 60 Cf. Díez Picazo, op. cit., p. 20 and 21. 61 Cf. Díez Picazo, op. cit., p. 21. 11