other rights and in all domestic laws that are enacted. 270 In essence, the Court has affirmed that if a State discriminates in respecting or ensuring a Convention right, it would be violating Article 1(1) and the substantive right in question. If, to the contrary, the discrimination refers to an unequal protection of domestic law or its enforcement, the fact must be examined in light of Article 24 of the American Convention.271 175. In the inter-American sphere, the preamble to the Convention of Belém do Pará indicates that violence against women is “a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men,” and also recognizes that the right of every women to a life free of violence includes the right to be free of any form of discrimination. 272 From a general standpoint, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter, “CEDAW”) defines discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”273 In this regard, the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter, “the CEDAW Committee”) has declared that the definition of discrimination against women “includes genderbased violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman [(i)] because she is a woman or [(ii)] that affects women disproportionately.” It also indicated that “[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”274 176. The Court reiterates that the inefficiency of the judicial system with respect to individual cases of violence against women promotes an environment of impunity that facilitates and promotes the repetition of acts of violence in general, and sends a message that violence against women may be tolerated and accepted. This encourages its perpetuation and the social acceptance of the phenomenon and causes women to feel unsafe and develop a permanent mistrust in the system for the administration of justice. 275 This inefficiency or indifference, in itself, discriminates against women in access to justice. Therefore, when there are specific indications of gender-based violence or it is suspected, the authorities’ failure to investigate the possible discriminatory motives behind the act of violence against a woman, may constitute a form of gender-based discrimination.276 177. The statements made by Jorge Rolando Velásquez Durán and Elsa Claudina Paiz Vidal, Claudina Velásquez’s father and mother, are consistent in indicating that, on the day the PNC agent, Carolina Elizabeth Ruiz, came to their home to interview them, she informed them that the crime scene had not been processed professionally because the victim’s origin and status had been prejudged, and she had been categorized “as a loose woman” owing to: (i) the place where her body was found; (ii) the fact that she used a choker necklace and a navel piercing Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 186, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, para. 217. 271 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Contentious Court”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 209, and Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C No. 298, para. 243. 272 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No.205, para. 396, citing the Convention of Belém do Pará, preamble and Article 6. 273 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, para. 394, citing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of December 18, 1979, Article 1. 274 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, para. 395, citing the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation 19: Violence against women, 11th session, 1992, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 84 (1994), paras. 1 and 6. 275 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, paras. 388 and 400, and Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 208. 276 Cf. Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 208. 270 63