PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ROBERTO F. CALDAS INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE OF VELÁSQUEZ PAIZ EL AL. V. GUATEMALA JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 19, 2015 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations And Costs) I. Introduction 1. The purpose of this opinion, precisely and partially dissenting from the grounds and conclusions indicated by the majority of the honorable judges of the Inter-American Court with regard to operative paragraph 6 of the judgment, is to declare - in addition to all the violations indicated in the ruling to which I adhere – the violation also of freedom of expression through clothing, particularly women’s clothing, in situations such as those of this case in which the use of clothes becomes an element that identified the victim with a social class that is especially vulnerable and continually stigmatized 2. Initially, I would like to emphasize my agreement with the judgment and the conclusions reached by the Court, and also the resulting reparations. I only differ, because I would add the violation of Articles 13(1) (freedom of expression) and 22(1) (freedom of movement or freedom to come and go), in relation to Article 1(1), all of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”). II. Violation of freedom of expression through clothing and freedom of movement 3. It has been fully proved that “the police made erroneous suppositions” about the victim, the value of her life and the importance of investigating her case, based merely on her appearance and her clothes, in violation of her right to freedom of expression through clothing, contained in Article 13(1) of the Convention. Moreover, owing to the prejudices associated with the place where the body was found, a “lower middle-class district,” the investigation of the crime scene was conducted carelessly, which also violated Article 22 of the Convention. 4. The victim’s clothing was the subject of discriminatory comments by the authorities, as frequently occurs to many women. In the investigations, it was said that she was dressed as a “gang member” or “a loose woman,” the latter term signifying “prostitute.” This was how the authorities considered her and that stereotype affected the way in which the subsequent investigation was conducted. In that situation, it should be established that the State’s actions also denied the right to freedom of expression, which can only be exercised in an environment free of coercion. It will be seen that this denial of freedom of expression existed and was perpetrated by the State’s actions, which reveal that a woman’s safety will not be guarantees if she merely appears to exteriorize, through her clothing, a certain sexual or cultural identity, or her membership of certain feminine groups. Therefore, I would add to the analysis that has been made unanimously by the full Court, the evident violation of Article 13(1), in relation to Article 1(1), both of the American Convention on Human Rights, considering that the way a