21 also sent the case file to the corresponding office to be assigned to one of the prosecutors in charge of investigating the crime of rebellion. This meant that by November 21, 2002, the investigation into the alleged rebellion was not over. 95. Said investigation was assigned to the Single Sectional Unit for Crimes against the Constitutional and Legal Order and Others, followed its course and was later closed with the order to dismiss dated May 22, 2003. According to the State, the order to dismiss is a decision to close an investigation and is issued once the evidence offered in the case has been weighed; it is different from the decision that determines the accused’ legal situation, which is mainly based on a personal assessment in a given context, but not an assessment of the facts to be investigated. The State contends that the information on the alleged illegal activities of the three women under investigation came from private individuals and that it was the State, by way of the Attorney General’s Office, that decided to have the case against the suspects dismissed. In consequence, the State considers that it fulfilled its obligations under articles 7.1 and 7.3 of the American Convention. 96. On July 21, 2003, the Office of the Prosecutor-Delegate for Human Rights learned of the complaint regarding alleged threats and the arbitrary detention committed against Mmes. Yarce, Naranjo, and Mosquera from November 12 to 21, 2002. Later, a Third Corporal of the National Army in Medellín was notified of the preliminary inquiry. Subsequently, the inquiry was referred as a matter of jurisdiction to the Office of the Aburrá Valley Provincial Prosecutor, which continued to pursue its activity. By order of June 29, 2006, it was ordered that an investigation be opened into the same Third Corporal and that certain evidence be collected to make it possible to determine what actually happened. On occasion of the evidence introduced into the investigation, the Office of the Inspector General of the Nation ordered that the matter be archived on November 9, 2007. The State argues that the suitable and effective remedy for protecting the rights that the victims mentioned consider to have been violated is an action for direct reparation before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, but it was not exhausted by them. 97. As for the alleged violation of the right to life of Ana Teresa Yarce (Article 4(1) of the American Convention), the State considers that it is not responsible for it, given that the authorities were not aware of a situation of actual and immediate risk to Ms. Yarce, and as a result they did not have any real possibility of preventing or avoiding that risk. The State considers that it acted within the legal framework in place and in keeping with its capacities to avoid the events of the instant case. In the context of these events, the alleged collaboration or acquiescence of state agents has never been shown, by either act or omission alleged to have been coordinated with, parallel to, or organized in serial fashion with the private persons responsible for the facts. 98. The petitioners indicate that on August 8, 2002, Ms. Ana Teresa Yarce filed a complaint with the Immediate Reaction Unit, which the State notes was filed more than two (2) years before the death of Ms. Yarce. Accordingly, the filing of that complaint cannot be taken as evidence of prior knowledge of a risk by the State, as the foreseeability of the risk by the State that the inter-American system demands requires that it entail a current, certain, and real threat, which are not found in this case. The State indicates that documentation is in the record that shows that a few days after the events she returned to the property that she says she vacated and established telephone communication. After various investigative and procedural steps, the 173rd Sectional Prosecutorial Office dismissed the case on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, considering that the facts being investigated were not addressed by any criminal statute, and found that the departure of Ms. Ana Teresa Yarce does not fit within the statutory description of the crime of forced displacement.