37 148. Because of its geographic location and the dire economic circumstances of the vast majority of its inhabitants, Comuna 13 has become a hotbed of activity by armed outlaw groups, which was the prevailing situation as of the date of the facts analyzed in this matter.112 This has generated periods of violence in the last 30 years, caused by clashes between the armed outlaw groups looking to control more turf and increase their share of the illegal drug trafficking business.113 Since the late 1980s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have established militia groups in the comuna.114 The Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson has documented how these groups established themselves in Comuna 13, “pushing back the criminal groups and street gangs that engaged in theft, extortion, drug trafficking, murder and other assaults on the inhabitants.”115 Once they established their control over the Comuna, the militias imposed their authority and order, supplanting the authority of the State.116 Since 1999, illegal autodefensa groups have made inroads into the peripheral areas of Comuna 13 to take on these militia groups directly. This merely served to increase crime in the area.117 149. This scenario prompted the State to step up its operations in Comuna 13, targeting illegal armed groups with the idea of restoring law and order. These operations included “Operation Mariscal” on May 21, 2002, followed by “Operation Potestad” in June, then “Operation Antorcha” in August and “Operation Orión” in October.118 These offensives were joint operations involving members of the National Army (from the Fourth Brigade), the National Policy (attached to the Antioquia Police Command), personnel from the Administrative Security Department (DAS), from the Colombian Air Force (FAC), from the Technical Investigations Corps (CTI) and from the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation.119 150. Various organizations have documented attacks committed during these operations against the civilian population, which included: murders, shooting people as they walked down the street; searching homes without a court order; authorizing the police and the army to perform the 110 Annex 47. Risk Assessment No. 016-10, Office of the Ombudsperson assigned to assess risks posed to the civilian population as a result of the armed conflict, Early Warning System (“Sistema de Alertas Temprana – SAT), Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 6. 111 Panorama de Derechos Humanos, Noche y Niebla y Violencia Política en Colombia, Caso Tipo No. 2: Comuna 13, [Human Rights Picture, Night, Fog and Political Violence in Colombia], CINEP & Justicia y Paz, Bogotá, May 2003, p 79. 112 Annex 47. Risk Assessment No. 016-10, Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 3. 113 Annex 47. Risk Assessment No. 016-10, Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 3. 114 Panorama de Derechos Humanos, Noche y Niebla y Violencia Política en Colombia, Caso Tipo No. 2: Comuna 13, [Human Rights Picture, Night, Fog and Political Violence in Colombia], CINEP & Justicia y Paz, Bogotá, May 2003, pp. 43-44. 115 Annex 48. Risk Assessment No. 009-07, Office of the Ombudsperson for the Assessment of the Risk Posed to the Civilian Population as a result of the armed conflict, Early Warning System (SAT), Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 1; Risk Assessment N˚ 016-10, Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 7. 116 Annex 48. Risk Assessment No. 009-07, Office of the Colombian Ombudsperson, p. 5. 117 Panorama de Derechos Humanos, Noche y Niebla y Violencia Política en Colombia, Caso Tipo No. 2: Comuna 13, [Human Rights Picture, Night, Fog and Political Violence in Colombia], CINEP & Justicia y Paz, Bogotá, May 2003, p. 44. 118 IACHR, Request for Provisional Measures submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Matter of Mery Naranjo et al. regarding the Republic of Colombia, July 3, 2006, paragraph 14. Provisional Measures File. 119 IACHR, Request for Provisional Measures submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Matter of Mery Naranjo et al. regarding the Republic of Colombia, July 3, 2006, paragraph 15. Provisional Measures File.