66 contemporaneous with these incidents before the IACHR.299 Being that it was aware of said context, the State had the obligation to adopt reasonable measures to prevent acts of violence against human rights defenders – perpetrated both by state agents and by paramilitary members in collusion with public security forces – as well as the duty to generate the necessary conditions for the performance of the work of human rights defense. 230. Second, the IACHR establishes that this accentuated duty of the State to protect and respond was further reinforced by two factors known to the State: the particular situation of risk to women human rights defenders, due to the historical discrimination they have suffered by virtue of their sex and the causes they pursue; and the aggravation of this risk in areas controlled by actors who are parties to the Colombian armed conflict. As described in the facts proven, the IACHR has issued repeated pronouncements as to how women who work in the defense of human rights who operate in areas of Colombia where there is military confrontation are targets of harassment and threats that affect both their members and their community work.300 The armed actors consider that the leadership exercised by women human rights defenders and their work of reporting human rights violations represents an obstacle in the way of their gaining social and territorial control in certain parts of the country.301 The State not only violates the right to personal integrity when it fails to adopt reasonable measures to prevent acts of violence against women human rights defenders in a known context of risk, but that also falls short in its obligation to respect and ensure their rights, free of any discrimination, set forth in Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 231. Thirdly, the IACHR understands that the State’s ineffectiveness at dismantling the paramilitary groups brings upon itself a special and ongoing duty to prevent and protect the civilian population, where such groups are present.302 In the matter before us, the State had a heightened duty to protect women human rights defenders inasmuch as it was aware of the paramilitary presence in the area, and it breached this obligation, with lasting effects for Ms. Rúa, Ospina and their next of kin up to the present. 232. Even though the State had been duly alerted to these specific risks, the Commission has not received information in the framework of this case illustrating reasonable measures that were adopted by the Colombian State to protect human rights defenders during the military operations mentioned, and the subsequent effects. Nor does it appear that the forced displacements reported have been investigated with the due diligence required. For example, in the case of Ms. Ospina, according to the facts proven she reported to the authorities that members of the official forces participated in the search of her home on March 3, 2003, which facilitated the subsequent paramilitary occupation of it, 299 Note DIDHD/GOI No. 77119/2954 from the Colombian State, November 15, 2012; Colombian State’s Note DDH.GOI/56107/2586 dated October 30, 2006; Colombian State’s Note DDH.GOI/31279/1533 dated June 14, 2006; Colombian State’s Note DDH.GOI/60162/2802 dated December 11, 2006. 300 IACHR, Violence and Discrimination Against Women in the Armed Conflict in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 67, October 18, 2006, para. 225. 301 IACHR, Violence and Discrimination Against Women in the Armed Conflict in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 67, October 18, 2006, para. 226. 302 IA Court of HR, Case of Valle Jaramillo et al v. Colombia. Merits, Reparation and Costs. Judgment of September 27, 2008. Series C No. 192, para. 81; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 126.