assisted by a lawyer.119 When imposing the precautionary measure of pre-trial detention, the presence of the required conventional procedural purposes must be verified; otherwise, it is presumed to be an advance application of the punishment. 94. Based on the violations of the rights recognized in the American Convention that have been alleged in the instant case, the Court will now examine: (1) Detención en firme, and (2) Pre-trial detention, and then reach a (3) Conclusion. B. Detención en firme 95. As previously indicated (supra para. 37), in 2003, Law 2003-101 amended article 160 of the common CCP of Ecuador so that it established detención en firme “in all the cases in which an order to initiate a trial is issued pursuant to article 232 [of the CCP], and this can only revoked by an acquittal and suspended in offenses punished by imprisonment.” The same amendment introduced article 173-A into the CCP, an article that regulated the said measure. That article established that the judge hearing the case had the obligation to order the detención en firme of the accused, except for: (a) those individuals classified as presumed accessories after the fact, and (b) those individuals being tried for an offense with a punishment of no more than one year’s imprisonment. The article also included the possibility that, if an order for prevention detention had been issued against the accused, when the order to initiate a trial was issued, this would be changed to detención en firme. 96. This Court notes that the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure were promulgated on January 13, 2003, and entered into force on that date. Then, on January 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Justice decided that “[i]n the criminal proceedings initiated prior to January 13, 2003, it was not appropriate to issue an order for detención en firme.” Consequently, detención en firme was only applicable to proceedings initiated for offenses presumably perpetrated after that date while, in the proceedings that were underway, the norms in force at the time they were initiated had to be applied.120 97. The foregoing reveals that, according to the transitory provision of the amendment of the common CCP and the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice (supra para. 57), detención en firme could not be applied to the presumed victims in this case because the order to initiate a trial was issued on March 19, 2002, prior to the date on which that measure came into force – January 13, 2003. Consequently, this Court considers that the detención en firme that was ordered was unlawful and violated Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the American Convention, in relation to the obligations established in Article 1(1) of this Convention, to the detriment of Jorge Villarroel Merino, Mario Romel Cevallos Moreno, Jorge Coloma Gaibor, Fernando López Ortiz, Amílcar Ascázubi Albán and Patricio Vinueza Pánchez. 98. In addition, in light of the regulation and application of detención en firme, the Court considers that it functioned as automatic and compulsory pre-trial detention based on the severity of the punishment attributed to the offense. Therefore, the judge was not required to analyze or justify whether the procedural purposes of detention during the trial had been met, or its appropriateness, necessity and proportionality pursuant to the obligations derived from the American Convention.121 Furthermore, an individual analysis of the situation of each of the accused 119 65. Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 101, and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, supra, para. The representative argued that the First Transitory Provision (amended by art. 34 of Law 2003-101, RO 743 of January 13, 2003), stated: “The criminal proceedings that are being processed when this Code of Criminal Procedure enters into force shall continue to be substantiated pursuant to the previous criminal procedure up until their conclusion, without prejudice to observance of the rules of due process established in the Constitution of the Republic.” 120 In addition, article 167 of the common Code of Criminal Procedure establishes as requirements to order the measure the existence of indications of the need “to deprive the accused of liberty to ensure his appearance before the court” and 121 26